Applying theories of ethno-cultural conflict and conflict resolution to collective violence in Indonesia by Kreuzer, Peter
Peter Kreuzer
Applying theories of ethno-
cultural conflict and conflict
resolution to collective violence
in Indonesia
PRIF REPORTS NO. 63
ã Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2002
Correspondence to:
PRIF  Leimenrode 29  D–60322 Frankfurt am Main
Telephone: +49 (0)69/95 91 04-0  Fax: +49 (0)69/55 84 81
Email: kreuzer@hsfk.de  website: http://www.hsfk.de
Language Editing: Catherine Mulder, Bracknell (UK)
ISBN: 3-933293-70-7
€ 10,–
Summary
In recent years especially, Indonesia has been shaken by recurrent waves of high levels of
collective violence. The forms have varied from ethnically and religiously-motivated
riots, causing several thousand fatalities, to internecine inter-communal warfare, in which
whole villages were wiped out, as happened in the Moluccas in the past four years. We
are also confronted with social practices of vigilantism and the selective killings of sor-
cerers. Last but not least on both the eastern and the western fringe of the vast Indonesian
territory, we find secessionist movements engaged in more or less violent conflicts with
the central state.
In the process of multi-dimensional transformation, Indonesia faces the very real dan-
ger of what might initially be interpreted as a temporary phenomenon accompanying
democratisation and liberalisation and which may turn out to be a characteristic feature of
a new kind of hybrid regime type in the making. Violence, in other words, once erupted
might become stabilised insofar as the conditions conducive to its perpetuation are put in
place in the process of transition.
In the search for an antidote to violence, it does not suffice to point to the after-effects
of the authoritarian and violent legacy of the Suharto era. Violence, as will be shown,
predates Suharto and is a characteristic feature of modern Indonesia. Similar patterns,
albeit adapted to new social, political as well as economic environments, emerge over and
over again. This repetitive structuration of collective violence is fed by certain basic fea-
tures of Indonesian culture and institutional design.
By elaborating these general observations, the paper will apply the results of three
major perspectives on ethno-cultural conflict and conflict resolution to the complex case
of Indonesian collective violence. The three perspectives – centring on the psychological,
the institutional and the cultural dimensions of collective violence – will be introduced,
their most promising aspects described and then applied to Indonesia on the macro-level
of conflict resolution. During this process, the opportunities as well as the limitations
offered by these three ways of looking at collective violence, in the many forms in which
this phenomenon emerges in Indonesia, will be evaluated.
The psychology-centred approach stresses the identity dimension of ethno-cultural
conflict. Irrespective of significant differences with other points of conflict analysis and
resolution, its protagonists argue that identity has to be treated as a basic need, which, if
sought for by the members of a self-defined identity group, must be fulfilled to some
degree, because otherwise it will be pursued irrespective of costs. Psychological ap-
proaches accept the relevance of economic, social and political dimensions, which partly
cause, contribute to and aggravate a conflict, but argue that the autonomy of the identity
dimension must be taken into adequate consideration, if conflict-resolution is to have any
chance of success. To come to grips with this problematic, various kinds of third-party
intervention are proposed. Most prominent are the different variants of strategies for
resolution which centre around workshops, in which representatives of the contending
parties are brought together under controlled circumstances: arena, players, structure,
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process and content of communication, all are controlled by the third party. The design
can aim at analytical problem-solving which focuses directly on devising new interpreta-
tions and new solutions to old and formerly intractable problems. Other approaches argue
that the workshops must be separated from any context which reminds the parties of their
roles as contenders in a conflict. They must be led to understand each other as human
beings, with fears, emotions, wishes and needs instead, so that they are able to see the
sameness of self and others and thereby surmount the tendencies to dehumanise and en-
mify the other, which are two necessary ingredients of recursive and large-scale inter-
group violence. Such workshops aim specifically at the re-enactment of psychic traumata,
collective fears and deeply (and sometimes unconsciously) held images of the collective
self and others in order to make them visible and mutually understood.
Three aspects of ethno-cultural conflict highlighted by the psychological approaches,
which are of special relevance to the case of Indonesia, are treated in some detail in the
text: the role of collective traumata, of competing psycho-cultural narratives and of em-
pathy-competence for the preponderant conflict style and its eventual re-formation in the
direction of more civility and cooperation. A brief look at the main instruments makes
clear that psychologically oriented theory, while being able to provide much input for the
analysis of conflict genesis and dynamics, provides only a very small spectre of conflict
resolution techniques, which, moreover, seem to work best on the local level and once the
conflict has already gone soft. Even if they might play a significant role in the drawn-out
processes of reconciliation, healing and the re-integration of fragmented societies in the
aftermath of violence, they provide no viable avenue for the initial de-escalation of hard-
ened intractable conflicts. Consequently, the use of psychological avenues for conflict
resolution should be of interest in all those inter-communal conflicts, where the lines of
confrontation have already gone soft, but the multiple underlying forces still exist. Work
on traumata, empathy training and the re-imagination of commonalities as well as divid-
ing lines is essential, if the very real danger of a return of violence is to be averted. Seen
from a long-term perspective, it is extremely important that the arenas of commonality
and communication built on this basis can be converted into an institutionalised form in
which all groups in conflict develop a common interest.
The institutional approach, while also generally accepting the view that the psychic
dimension is of prime importance in the development of ethno-cultural conflict, neve-
theless centres on institutional remedies for the conflicts, because in the view of its pro-
tagonists, psychic predispositions are not malleable in the short and medium term. For
them, it makes most sense to concentrate on those dimensions of conflict which can be
manipulated and promise some positive effect in the short to medium term. Two basic
schools may be differentiated according to the prescribed recipes for conflict manage-
ment. The consociationalists propose a constitutional engineering which aims at guaran-
teeing group rights by providing political institutions with a group representation agenda:
veto rights for all politically-organised ethno-cultural groups, territorial and personal
autonomy arrangements guaranteeing the highest possible degree of internal self-rule,
proportional representation of all ethno-cultural interest groups according to their
strength, broad-based parliamentary government, to name just a few. Integrationalists
share the power-sharing orientation of the consociationalists. They argue, however, that
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political institutions ought to be structured in such a way that their raison d’être – the
plural society and its political expression in ethnicised politics – is removed in the long
term. Political institutions should, in their view, provide a centripetal counter-force
against the centrifugal tendencies characteristic to plural societies.
They aim at providing institutional incentives for inter-group cooperation and concen-
trate much of their practical suggestions on different options for electoral engineering
which promote cross-cutting alliances. Both approaches are clearly in favour of federal
designs. Because of their antagonistic paradigms, they differ sharply on the concrete
forms the federations should take. Consociationalists opt for carving up the unitarian
states along ethnic lines, thereby constructing ethnically rather than homogenous states.
Integrationalists opt for mixed, non-communal states which might promote intra-group
rifts and foster inter-group alliances.
One possible recipe for the Indonesian problematic which can be derived from this lit-
erature is a need for the empowerment of the constituent parts of the Indonesian nation-
state. As much political power as possible should be devolved from the federal to the
state level (which, in the case of Indonesia, might at this point in time imply the devolu-
tion of further federal preserves on the one hand, but also a re-centralisation of some of
the rights and duties which have been devolved to the district level in recent years). These
measures of state-centred devolution should be supplemented with a strengthened politi-
cal representation of the regions in the centre, so that enduring regional interest in na-
tional-level politics is safeguarded. It would also be sensible to open up avenues for the
formulation and representation of purely regional, ethnic or religious interests in the field
of parliamentarian politics. All groups must have the right to form political parties. As
long as they receive enough votes, it must be possible for them to press their cases in
local, regional or national level parliaments. A corresponding, institutionally-grounded
strategy of enhanced elite-cooperation is a sensible complement which could minimise
the danger of political stasis resulting from mutually-incompatible aims. A further neces-
sary ingredient of institutional redesigning should be a strengthening of the state, espe-
cially a rise in status, pay and the number of police forces. By creating an incentive
structure which makes efficiency, rule-bound behaviour and clean-handedness pay, in
terms of career and status, the police forces must be enabled to guarantee internal security
in the medium term. This can hopefully counteract the pervasive tendency to privatise
security and violence. Players, who do not abide by the rules or have problematic track
records should not be punished in the first instance, but deactivated by means of a sensi-
ble retirement policy.
The cultural perspective does not offer a particular menu of conflict resolution tech-
niques, but centres on the necessity to check the recipes for conflict resolution for their
cultural commensurateness. Proponents of this approach criticise the fact that neither
psychologically nor institutionally-grounded strategies give prominence to the cultural
conditions under which their recipes are put to use. If, however, conflicts as cultural
events are filled with, understood through and explained by specific cultural symbolism,
then it should be of eminent importance to analyse these symbolic universes. Culturalists
argue that the success or failure of the psychologically-grounded strategies as well as the
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institution-centred strategies is firmly based in strategic adaptations to the culture of the
recipient society. They may also need parallel exercises of a purposeful change in cultural
values, norms, cognitions, schemes, emotive structures and suchlike. Oft-prescribed in-
stitutional engineering must be accompanied by the probably even more daunting task of
cultural engineering.
A look at Indonesian culture reveals a corresponding explicit culture of conflict avoid-
ance and an implicit need for violent conflict resolutions in highly critical situations. It is
argued that the premium on conflict avoidance leaves the culture without any systematic
way of dealing with fundamental conflicts between societal groups in a cooperative and
non-hierarchical way. Strategies for compromise as well as options for long-term power-
sharing are lacking. Therefore, it is an important long-term task to develop new strategies
for devising win-win conceptions of problem-solving out of existing cultural practices
and to emancipate the constituent parts of the polity, so that a public discourse between
the different communities can be initiated, in which all parties can air their grievances and
pursue their interests. Such a perspective begs the question of the cultural adequacy of the
strategy of nation-building, which has been implemented in Indonesia during recent dec-
ades since the eve of independence. It is argued that Indonesia needs a multi-cultural if
not a multi-national concept of the state and corresponding community, which should
find its institutional expression in a future Federation of Indonesia. If such an attempt is
eventually to succeed, it clearly needs a reformulation of the concept of the Indonesian
nation, which until now is described in terms of a homogenous Indonesian people on a
mythologised violent revolutionary path towards national sovereignty and a host of other
violence-prone symbolic ingredients. These aspects clearly have to be demythologised, a
task, which in the short term is up to the social scientists.
What is most needed in Indonesia is a change from the mere repetition of well-known
theories-in-use and efforts to optimise strategies within the boundaries of the hitherto
used paradigm, but a more fundamental inquiry, which at least contemplates the option of
replacing some or most of those institutional and cultural patterns which led repeatedly to
violence by alternative patterns. Obviously, there is no easy way out and no single strat-
egy will suffice. Enabling ethnic representation while undercutting ethnic outbidding,
empowering the regions while creating enough incentives to bind them to the centre, de-
constructing the violent, centripetal tendencies as well as the authoritarian orientation of
the national political culture and replacing them with participatory and cooperation-
oriented symbol structures while safeguarding the vision of historical continuity and col-
lective self-sameness, keeping the initially artificial flowers of interethnic contact in
workshops alive and transforming them into creatures which, over time, display a mod-
ernised image of indigenous design and a robust health, are some of the foremost and, at
times, contradictory tasks which have to be tackled if Indonesia is to have a realistic
chance of surmounting violence, albeit not in the short nor medium term, but at least in
the long term.
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1. Introduction: Indonesian violence and ethno-conflict research
Over the past few years especially, Indonesia has been engulfed in a vast amount and a
staggering variety of collective violence. I will begin at the eastern borders in West Papua
where the smouldering conflict over its inclusion into the fold of the Indonesian nation-
state was rekindled and, from there, move on to the Molukkas, where thousands of people
have died in internecine inter-religious fighting. Continuing the westward journey, I may
also turn to inter-religious violence in Sulawesi and the apparent return of savagery to
Kalimantan where heads are skewered on large poles to terrify the innocent and convey
pictures of strength and resistance, only to finish in the far west of Indonesia in strife-torn
Aceh, where the rebel movement GAM has been fighting for independence since the mid
1970s. Here, the last few years have seen an upsurge in ferocious violence, in the course
of which several thousand people have been killed, thousands of others have lost their
homes and human rights violations have abounded.
A ring of violence seems to be encircling the central island of Java. But violence is not
just a phenomenon of the outlying areas. Violence has struck in the centre, too. We need
only think of the anti-Chinese riots of 1998, of the killings of sorcerers and religious fig-
ures or, to draw closer to day-to-day life, the repeated cases of vigilantism and the much
decried gang violence, the violence perpetrated by armed militias or even schoolboys,
who seem to think that fighting members of other schools is a kind of sporting game.
Most of the above-mentioned examples of violent group behaviour point to the fact
that violence is not a phenomenon of recent years. As Aceh, West Papua, the Petrus kill-
ings of the early 1980s, or the most horrendous of all killing fields, the massacres of
1965/66 illustrate, violence dates back to the early days of the Suharto era.1 And, a look at
the perpetrators of violence shows that, although the state and its security apparatus carry
a heavy burden, a similar burden must be shouldered by civil society.2 It would be too
easy, however, to dump the responsibility for the predominance of violence solely at the
door of Suharto and his New Order regime (1965-1998). If we go further back in history,
we see a volcano of violent rhetoric in the speeches of President Sukarno (1945-1965), an
exaltation of violence as identity-building device and a willingness to use violence for
political purposes if deemed necessary.
To put it succinctly: violence, that is large-scale and deadly collective violence,3 has
been a companion to the whole era of modern Indonesian history. It has permeated all
1 For a short chronology on most of the above mentioned cases of social, that is collective, violence, see
Appendix 2.
2 On the multiple forms of social violence, committed by private militias of varying shades, see Kees van
Dijk. The Privatization of the Public Order. In: Ingrid Wessel, Georgie Wimhöfer (eds.). Violence in
Indonesia. Hamburg, (Abera), 2001, pp. 152-167.
3 I restrict the term violence to a) social or collective violence and b) direct violence, which can be sepa-
rated from the more inclusive concepts of structural and cultural violence. Whereas “direct violence is a
fact; structural violence is a process; and cultural violence is a non-variant in so far as cultural phenom-
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spheres of politics and has left its mark on all processes of social interaction. Therefore,
although each incident of violence, each of the cases I mentioned has to be analysed in its
own right, it must also be contextualised in this tradition of societal violence and the
structures, institutions and culture which brought it into being and were formed by it.
In spite of a pressing need to do so, violence reduction and the civilisation of conflict
behaviour have not been part of the central aims of policy-making in Indonesia until now.
Democracy, however, cannot flourish in an environment, where many political players
threaten to or actually use violent means, if other means have previously failed to bring
about the desired results. Consideration of violence reduction from any systematic point
of view should include a reflection on the reasons for societal violence and strategies,
which aim at its civilised management and eventual resolution or transformation.
To this end, an informed look at the different strands of conflict, especially ethno-
conflict research, seems a promising option. Taking note of the vast amount of theory-
driven literature on ethno-cultural conflict and options for its resolution, it is rather inter-
esting to note a similarly large amount of literature on concrete conflict cases, which
however hardly ever take note of the results of the efforts of theoreticians. Strangely
enough, ethno-conflict theory, conflict-resolution theory and individual cases are only
seldom brought together in a systematic way to develop theory-driven strategies for vio-
lence prevention or the eventual mitigation of violent conflict. The following study in-
tends to show that theories of ethno-cultural conflict and its resolution can successfully be
utilised to develop strategies for conflict resolution for rather specific cases – they offer a
structuring device for focused analysis and a raft of measures and moves from which
appropriate steps can be chosen for each individual case.
Basically three perspectives – centring on the psychological, institutional and cultural
dimension of ethnic conflict and its resolution – can be differentiated. In the following
study I do not want to choose between them, but argue that all three approaches have
indeed something to offer for the eventual surmounting of violence in inter-group con-
flict. If the civilisation of conflict should eventually succeed, the most promising aspects
of all three perspectives ought to be brought out and a combination of strategies devised,
so that psychological, institutional and cultural reframing can be used to stabilise one
another.
In this study I will provide a discussion of some of the more important findings of the
three main strands of ethno-conflict-theory and their implications for eventual conflict-
management. The account on the findings of ethno-conflict research does not aim to
ena are modified over long periods” (Felipe E. MacrGregor, S.J., Marcial Rubio C., Rejoinder to the
theory of structural violence. In: Kumar Rupesinghe, Marcial Rubio C. (eds.). The Culture of Violence.
Tokyo, New York, Paris (United Nations University), 1994, pp. 42-58, citation p. 52). Violence is in the
first place deliberate, actual or threatened bodily harm. It includes deliberate damage to property, how-
ever, insofar as acts of violence aimed at the destruction/looting of property are suited to arouse the
same kinds of emotion, they result in a similar state of cognitive restructuring of the environment and
lead to similar behavioral consequences.
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cover the theoretical field thoroughly, but to carve out those aspects which are of some
significance for the case of ethno-cultural violence in Indonesia. Therefore, the theoretical
perspectives will not be dealt with in isolation. They will be configured according to the
needs of the Indonesian case from the outset. The discussion will concentrate on those
aspects of theory which can be used for the development of strategies f r violence-
management in Indonesia. Therefore, not only the arguments on Indonesia, but the pres-
entation of the fruit of ethno-conflict research will be coloured by the peculiarities of the
forms violence takes in the Indonesian case. I will begin with the intricacies of the psy-
chological dimension and then proceed to the problematic of the institutional and struc-
tural aspects of collective violence. Finally, I will finish with a discussion of the role
culture plays in inter-group conflict. A short discussion on the feasibility of the proposed
measures will conclude this study (chap. 5). Even though I will provide strategies for
civilising the rather violent mode of ethno-cultural conflict in Indonesia, this study cannot
provide answers to the individual cases, but instead it concentrates on the underlying
commonalities which bind the cases together over time and space. I will only discuss the
underlying fundamentals of the psychological, political as well as cultural make-up of
Indonesian society, which in my view enable and promote the repeated recourse to vio-
lent means of conflict management. The detailed analysis of the multitude of different
cases of violent ethno-cultural conflict is beyond the scope of my more limited effort.
Therefore, it has to be pointed out, that this study can only provide some rough guidance
for strategic decisions on the macro-level of politics. Although a number of strategies are
proposed, the operationalisation for the Indonesian case can only be hinted at. Follow up
work, which focuses at fleshing out in detail the strategies in terms of content, agency,
process and time frame must partly precede and partly accompany any implementation
even of the national level strategies. Local and regional level strategies, which focus di-
rectly on specific conflicts are still to be fleshed out, an endeavour, which is clearly be-
yond the scope of this study.4
Although it should seem evident, the meaning of the concept of ethnic, or ethno-
cultural conflict (as I would prefer to call it) and conflict resolution, is not clear. Even a
cursory look at the vast amount of literature makes it abundantly clear, that there are at
times fundamentally different views on ethnic conflict and correspondingly large differ-
ences in the views held about adequate strategies for conflict resolution arising from these
differences in perspective. Basically, research can be grouped under three perspectives
according to the type of strategies they offer for conflict resolution.
Ø A first group could be called the psychological approach, which puts the identity
dimension of ethno-cultural conflicts into the centrefold of analysis and treatment. They
4 One further caveat seems in order. This study does not aim at providing an overview of the genesis of
Indonesian violence. The development of the concrete interaction between the different agents which
collided in the political realm is not presented here. For a more action-centred view on Indonesian poli-
tics, see my Politik der Gewalt – Gewalt in der Politik: Indonsien (HSFK-Report 4/2000) Frankfurt,
2000.
4 Peter Kreuzer
basically argue that severe conflicts with a significant identity dimension cannot be man-
aged without perpetuating the risk of violence. To ban the threat of violence, they have to
be resolved and ultimately transformed. Consequently, psychological approaches centre
on the reframing of the cognitive, emotive and motivational frames of the groups in con-
flict. In spite of significant differences between the authors, all agree on the need to build
up or enhance the capacity for (strategic) empathy, to lay open and acknowledge mutual
fears and accept the other groups’ basic needs for identity, security and well-being as
legitimate and non-negotiable.
Ø A second group centres on the structural and institutional designs of societies stricken
by ethno-cultural conflict. Even though the authors of this school diverge on the question
of causation, they agree on the remedies, which can help manage the conflicts more co-
operatively and peacefully: the most promising recipes, they argue, will aim at construc-
tive reengineering of the fundamental institutional design of the political systems, so that
institutional incentives for cooperation and punishments for confrontational strategies
aiming at ethnic outbidding are maximised. In a political system designed accordingly,
even opportunistically motivated politicians will turn to cooperation and restraint, as only
such behaviour promises rewards.
Ø A third group argues that the collective phenomenon of culture is neglected in the
psychological as well as in the institutional approach although conflicts not only occur in
specific cultural settings, but are cultural events themselves. Consequently, the authors
argue that culture must be integrated in both the psychological as well as the institutional
approach, because any failure to do so, produces incomplete and inadequate explanations
of and remedies for violent conflict practices. From a culturalist perspective, all possible
remedies have to pass the “culture test”. Institutional design and psychological strategies
for conflict resolution translate into political practice only in the interaction with the cul-
tural traits of the society concerned. Institutional design does matter, however. The way it
will influence political behaviour is fundamentally dependent on the specific cultural
context: on the understandings of basic ordering principles (such as authority, power,
participation, ruler and people). Psychological strategies for conflict resolution are help-
ful. The same strategies, however, can produce strikingly different results depending on
the cultural background of the participants engaged. Therefore, there can be no universal
recipe for conflict resolution. The underlying universal assumptions of non-destructive
human interaction must be translated into adequate cultural forms for every single case.
The “treatments” have to be adapted to the “patien s”.
All three perspectives aim at reframing the violence-enabling factors, they differ,
however, on their judgement with respect to the minimal aim and consequently as well
with respect to the sensible avenues open for reframing. Whereas institutional approaches
confine themselves largely to devising new environments which maximise the chances
for the civilised handling of inter-group conflict, cultural as well as psychological per-
spectives point to the fact that such institutional reframing is always open to being re-
versed or undercut by competing political players as long as there is no corresponding
reframing of psychological and cultural predispositions toward conflict behaviour.
Whereas psychological approaches commence by transforming fundamental psychologi-
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cal concepts on groups and group processes, thereby keeping the universalistic orientation
ingrained in psychology, culturalist perspectives point to the different content dimension
of the cultural settings in which conflicts are enacted. Institutional approaches, while
sometimes drawing from the other two for the analysis of conflict behaviour, commence
from the insight, that neither psychological nor cultural environments are easily manipu-
lated. The aim of reframing has to be confined to those variables which have the highest
degree of manipulability and promise significant effects on conflict behaviour at the same
time. They argue that this conditions are best fulfilled by the institutional set-up of the
political system.
A large part of the argument will centre on the dimension of identity and its psycho-
logical, institutional and cultural representation. This is not to discount alternative expla-
nations of or approaches to ethno-cultural violence. To be sure, there do exist structural
inequities in a number of the cases mentioned in the text and they clearly provide some of
the causes of conflict. We could also, at least in some cases, successfully apply some
variants of class analysis. Nevertheless, two arguments will be put forward against cen-
tring on the socio-structural dimensions of ethno-cultural conflict in Indonesia.
Firstly, on a general level, these dimensions play no significant role in the theoretical
literature on ethnic conflict summarised below. Irrespective of the rather different inter-
pretations of ethnic violence given by proponents of the three strands of science, all insist
on the centrality of the identity dimension along which the contending groups are op-
posed. Even for institutionalists, not to mention psychologists or culturalists, ethno-
cultural conflict centres around identity needs which have to be met and mediated by
some sort of design. So most researchers effectively argue in line with Burton, that the
need for group identity, security and welfare are non-negotiable needs, which have to be
safeguarded by any strategy aiming at conflict-resolution. Questions of equality, justice,
participation and representation can only be dealt with after a formula for cooperative
conflict management has been devised. Secondly, arguing from the country level, it is my
contention that, in the Indonesian case, underlying the structural inequities and configur-
ing “classes” in conflict are ethno-culturally determined group identities, according to
which scarce resources are distributed. In one way, these identities are products of re-
source distribution, as they are stabilised by durable practice. In a more meaningful way
however, these identities precede any form of resource distribution, as at any given time it
has to be decided, which identity is valid for the purpose of distribution. Groupness cre-
ates the dividing lines between the in and out-group, which in effect provide the cognitive
map according to which resources are distributed. Groupness also provides the safe-
guarding of human needs in terms of security, identity and welfare. What matters most
for scientific analysis is the form groupness takes.
The different forms of groupness can be treated either as the causes or effects of social
or economic structuration. Their continuity and change ought to be analysed as a process
of continual (re-)construction. I argue that in the case of ethno-cultural conflict any at-
tempt at changing patterns of violent conflict behaviour has to be based on devising a
strategy for a purposeful reconstruction of group identities. To do so, it has to concentrate
on the specifics of groupness as the cause for socio-economic structuration and agency.
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Different forms of groupness rely on different symbolic forms which legitimate the way
group members perceive reality and interact with their environment. Therefore, the forms
in which groups constitute themselves play a central role for framing perception and ac-
tion-style. In Indonesia, as in a host of other countries, ethno-cultural identity “is not just
a mask for social class conflict; … ethnic affiliations are not just a convenient vehicle by
which elites satisfy their own class aspirations.”5 In line with Horowitz and others, I ar-
gue that in a large number of cases “ethnic affiliations typically fulfil needs that might
otherwise go unmet.”6 They exhibit a family resemblance which differentiates them from
all other imaginations of collective identity: ascription. Even though ethno-cultural iden-
tities can hark back on either language, descent, tradition or religion as constituting the
unifying feature, any of these features is treated as if it were a natural, inborn quality of
the group members. To be sure, ethno-cultural groups can “become more or less inclu-
sive. Some small ethnic groups can merge with or absorb others, or are absorbed by them,
producing larger, composite groups. Larger groups, on the other hand, may divide into
their component parts … Group boundaries thus grow wider or narrower by processes of
assimilation or differentiation. … ethnic identity typically embraces multiple levels or
tiers, so that it is possible for an individual to claim more than one identity.”7 Notwith-
standing these observations, ethno-cultural groups always rely on a “significant element
of descent”8 and the fiction of some variant of extended putative kinship. Therefore,
ethno-cultural identity can provide a more or less total primary configuration of the
world, which differs categorically from configurations according to other symbolic uni-
verses (class, citizen, etc). Inevitably it has the same claim to legitim cy and primacy.
Whereas in the Western World the hierarchy of symbolic forms has been established,
in Indonesia, as in a large number of other countries outside the First World, it is still up
for debate. I argue that the legitimacy of an ethno-cultural symbolic universe can and
should not be questioned in the first place, as this does not seem to be a fruitful avenue.
I will argue that in the case of Indonesia, democracy and peaceful conflict manage-
ment is only possible (a) in a federal institutional set-up. Any unitarian design will, in the
medium term, erode democratic participation. To democratise the polity and civilise the
conflict behaviour of the competing groups, in my view, it is also necessary, (b) to accept
ethno-cultural identities as partly political phenomena and enable groups defined in
ethno-cultural terms to participate in a meaningful way in politics at the local, regional
and national level. This entails (c) a reframing of the hitherto preponderantly assimila-
tionist concepts of the Indonesian nation and people and (d) a demythologisation of the
national history, which still contains extensive meaning structures, which praise and glo-
rify violence, hierarchy and discipline. Still unfinished is also (e) the “invention of pol-
5 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London (University of California
Press), 2nd ed. 2000, p. 89.
6 Ibid., p. 74, see pp. 74-83 for a moredetail d analysis of the functionality of ethnicity.
7 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
8 Ibid., p. 55.
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tics”9. Whereas in neighbouring Malaysia, as Milner points out “the practice of politics is
undoubtedly well established”10, the same cannot be said of Indonesia. Here politics was
neither invented in the late colonial era in the first place nor had it a chance to develop
during either the rule of Sukarno or Suharto. As an ideology as well as in practice, it is
therefore still in its infancy. Whereas in Malaya, the discourse of power was significantly
formed in the language of rule-bound political contest in the late colonial era with the
corresponding practice following suit, in Indonesia, we find no counterpart to either dis-
course or the practice of politics right up to the present-day. There obviously was an anti-
colonial discourse as well as a corresponding practice in late colonial Indonesia, but the
answers given to the question regarding the contemporary as well as future rules of the
power game were not politics and rule-bound contest, but unity, power, struggle and h-
gemony. In spite of more than 50 years of independence, the Indonesian social contract is
still weak and woefully incomplete. A living contract would have to provide “the rules of
the game to govern the distribution of the social pie and to achieve peaceful conflict
resolution.”11 Any effort at sustainable restoration of inter-ethnic peace “requires the re-
constitution of the social contract.”12 That means, that conceptions of participation, repre-
sentation, as well as of justice and equity have to be debated and a fundamental consensus
on them achieved in the medium term.
All these efforts should be supported by (f) a raft of measures which aim to prevent vio-
lence between ethno-cultural groups in all those regions, where significant inter-group
tensions exist or where violence seems to be a major risk. In all cases, where politicians,
community leaders and the public aim at sustainable reconciliation after the experience of
large-scale collective violence, there is a dire need. Most suited to this task seem to be the
different variants of psychologically-oriented workshops and other similar approaches.
2. Human psyche and ethno-cultural conflict
The psychologically-based literature on ethno-cultural conflict and its resolution is, as
stated above, dominated by approaches which centre on the identity dimension of the
conflict. Identity is, in the words of Burton, a basic need of collectivities and as such non-
negotiable.13 If this need is not met, the group’s members will strive for need-fulfilment
irrespective of the possible adverse consequences. Recourse to utility-based calculation
and rational choice strategies will be in vain, as members of a group which feel deprived
9 For an excellent study on this process in colonial Malaya, see: Anthony Milner, The Invention of Poli-
tics in Colnial Malaya. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1995.
10 Ibid., p. 294.
11 S. Mansoob Mursheed, Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment:. An Introduction. In: Journal of
Peace Research Vol. 39, No. 4, July 2002, pp. 387-93.
12 Ibid., p. 392.
13 Two other non-negotiable needs would be security and welfare.
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in their identity needs will go to great lengths to (re-)establish a meaningful and secure
identity. Therefore, severe conflicts with a significant identity dimension cannot be man-
aged, but have to be resolved and ultimately transformed. Otherwise, the threat of vio-
lence persists.
Psychological approaches accept the relevance of economic, social and political di-
mensions, which partly cause, contribute to and aggravate a conflict, but argue that the
autonomy of the identity dimension must be taken into adequate consideration if conflict
resolution is to have any chance of success. Their efforts aim precisely at unearthing this
dimension and devising solutions whereby these needs can be met.
For the aims of this paper – offering some theory-driven strategies for the Indonesian
case, there is no need to present an overview of the field. I will concentrate on portraying
three variables of conflict (behaviour) instead, the adequate treatment of which is gener-
ally perceived to be of crucial importance to eventual success in any effort of conflict
resolution and which, in my view, are central to the case of Indonesia: empathy compe-
tence, chosen collective traumata and competing psycho-cultural narratives.
2.1. Strengthening empathy competence
Empathy seems to be one critical variable the existence or absence of which can account
for a significant amount of success or failure in the handling of conflicts. 14 Empathy and
the related con ept of role assumption15 are seen as two of the most important inter-
related mechanisms for reducing individual aggression.
Basically, empathy and role assumption16 centre around the ability of putting yourself
into the position of your counterpart in any form of social interaction. If role assumption
is to work as a conflict-reducing device, central to this is not only the ability to take the
role of the other, but also the willingness to take it in all, especially in its affective and
14 Closely related to but not identical to this focus on empathy and role assumption would be the question
of the meta-communicational competence made available by cultural scripts and schemes for conflict
behavior. Meta-communication basically refers to communication about the ongoing communication it-
self: discussing its rules, aims, structuration and suchlike.
15 These concepts are strongly anchored in social psychology as well as in the pragmatic tradition of soci-
ology. After all, the idea of the central role of the other and the ability to assume the role of the other for
the constitution of the individual (social) self has been developed by George Herbert Mead (see espe-
cially his: Mind, self, and society: From the standpoint of a social behaviorist. Chicago (Chicago Un-
versity Press), 1934). Later prominence was given to these concepts by representatives of the symbolic
interactionist tradition in sociology (e.g. Erving Goffmann), developmental psychologists such as Law-
rence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget and psychiatrists (e.g. Erik Erikson). For a sh rt overview, see Gisela
Steins, Robert A. Wicklund, Zum Konzept der Perspektivenübernahme: Ein kritischer Überblick. In:
Psychologische Rundschau, Vol. 44, 1993, pp. 226-239.
16 From a psychological perspective, thre  dimensions of role assumption have to be differentiated: visual-
spatial (or perceptual), conceptual (or cognitive) and affective role assumption. The interest of conflict
research centres on the second and third dimensions.
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motivational dimensions. Being able to anticipate the cognitions, feelings and motivations
of others adds a completely new dimension to strategically-designed social action. On the
strategic level of social action, we thereby might optimise our own patterns of action,
insofar as we obtain a more complete picture of the motivational structure of the other.
On a further, not necessarily connected, level, we become involved with the emotive state
of the other, and thereby partly restructure our own action according to the moral catego-
ries of adequacy, guilt and shame.
Empathy, however, is not to be confused with cognitive or emotional identification.
As a conflict-structuring device, it has to be seen as an analytical ability or capacity. As
Rothman hypothesises:
“analytical empathy could lead parties to accept that the other side, in ways quite similar to
one's own side, is so deeply motivated to fulfil underlying needs and express their own val-
ues fully, to overcome past traumas and insure future safety and expression of identity, that
coercion or suppression of those needs and values will probably be counter productive”17.
In this way, the chances that a foundation of sameness is developed by the sheer act of
trying to see, interpret and feel as your opponent sees, interprets and feels are maximised,
which later on can be used as a starting point for the construction of a growing universe
of shared meanings, judgements and evaluations.
Building empathy is most important in conflicts which revolve around fundamental is-
sues of identity.18 As literature on the psychocultural prerequisites of constructive conflict
resolution points out, empathy clearly facilitates “agreements with opponents whose ag-
gression is defensively motivated.”19 Empathy, although clearly an individual competence
is partly culture-derived and dependent, insofar as its “typical” level and form are re-
flected in the cultural set-up of a given society and passed on by the enculturation of the
group: some cultures open up more avenues for empathy whereas others foreclose role
assumption and empathy in the scripts and schemes they provide.
2.2. Unearthing unresolved traumata
Vamik Volkan invented the concept of “chosen trauma”. He defines it as “the collective
memory of a calamity that once befell a group's ancestors. It is ... a shared mental repre-
sentation of the event, which includes realistic information, fantasized expectations, in-
tense feelings, and defenses against unacceptable thoughts.”20 Groups centring on a cho-
17 Jay Rothman, Dialogue in Conflict: Past and Future, in: Eugene Weiner (ed), The Handbook of
Interethnic Coexistence (New York: Continuum, 1998), pp. 217-235, citation p. 225.
18 See for example Marc Howard Ross, The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in
Comparative Perspective (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 169-170, Rothman,
see above (footnote 17), pp. 224-227.
19 Ross, see above (footnote 18), p. 107.
20 Vamik Volkan, Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism, New York (Farrar/Straus/Giroux),
1997, p. 48.
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sen trauma21 largely define their identity “by the transgenerational transmission of injured
selves infused with the memory of the ancestors' trauma.”22 Chosen traumas are “mental
representations of a historical event that ... can bring members of a large group to-
gether.”23 They become heavily mythologised over time and thereby act as central carriers
not only of collective meaning (cognition) but also of emotion and affect. In respect to
social action chosen traumas “bring with them powerful experiences of loss and feelings
of humiliation, vengeance, and hatred that trigger a variety of unconscious defense
mechanisms that attempt to reverse these experiences and feelings”24.
In trauma-oriented groups, the schemes derived from the unresolved confrontation
with the traumatic experience result in a traumatised self-representation, which continues
to bind the group to the cognitive, emotive and motivational schemes developed in the
past. Therefore, trauma-oriented groups encountering conflict will tend to re-enact their
trauma-derived scripts,25 whereas other groups are more open to experience the novelty of
new situations, devise new coping strategies and schemes. This psychoanalytical view of
the role of different identity conceptions for social action is supported by social-
psychological studies on the influence of relative deprivation on social perception and
action. A large number of studies have showed that it is not so much individual (egoistic)
21 The concept of chosen trauma differs somewhat from the normal understanding of concept of collective
trauma, which is more presence and action-centred. Veertzberger defines collective trauma as “a sha-
tering, often violent event that affects a community of people …, and that results from human behavior
that is politically motivated and has political consequences. Such an event injures in one stab, penetrat-
ing all psychological defensive barriers of participants and observers, allowing no space for denial
mechanisms and thus leaving those affected with an acute sense of vulnerability and fragility. Such
traumatic events not only affect communities but sometimes also create communities, so that ‘otherwise
unconnected persons who share a traumatic experience seek one another out and develop a form of fel-
lowship on the strength of that common tie.’” (Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, The Antinomies of Collective
Political Trauma: A Pre-Theory, in: Political Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1997, pp. 863-876, citation p.
864). In the case of trans-generationally transmitted traumata, the mechanisms working in traumatisa-
tion obviously are fundamentally different. Here it is not a sudden experience, but a long-term sociali-
sation process, by which the traumatic “logic” is embedded in the collective history and implanted into
the individual consciousness. The interplay between cognitive and emotive aspects however is basically
similar to the ones of an acute traumatisation, which are summarised by Vertzberger: “no matter how
important are the cognitive changes induced by traumatic events, it is affect, ‘the emotional brain’, that
drives cognition in these situations, and not the other way around” (Ibid., p. 866).
22 Ibid., p. 48.
23 Ibid., p. 81.
24 Ibid., p. 82.
25 This analysis corresponds to the “group-think” hypotheses put forward by Janis. In the case of collective
traumatisation one possible outcome is “community groupthink” (Veertzberger), which is characterised
among others by “a growing closure and resistance to opinions that contest the dominant received wis-
dom about the causes for and meaning of the traumatic event … . … deindividuation sets in. Outgroups
are viewed in stereotypic, mostly negative terms. … communication across the divide becomes difficult
if not impossible. The consequent intensification of between group hostility entraps the antagonists in
self-defeating societal conflict, that hardens with time, as the traumatic event becomes embedded in so-
cietal consciousness and acquires mythical proportions that allow little flexibility for reinterpreting its
meaning” (Veertzberger, see above (footnote 21) pp. 868-869).
Options for the resolution of violent ethno-cultural conflicts in Indonesia11
deprivation that leads people to rebel, but fraternal deprivation. Neither political attitudes
nor activities can be directly connected to any individual utility function. So “the political
power of deprivation lies in the perception of collective ... deprivation. The picture that
emerges ... is that citizens understand and react to the political world in terms of group
interests, including the interests of groups they are not part of.”26 Collective traumata,
however, are representations of most extreme experiences of fraternal deprivation. There-
fore, we should expect there to be significant differences in conflict perception and be-
haviour between trauma-oriented groups and other groups.
Let us now have a short look at violence in Indonesia: Wouldn’t it make sense to per-
ceive Indonesia as a traumatised society?27 The national revolution, was not only a story
of revolutionary fervour and heroic fighting, but also a story of treachery, of pitting Indo-
nesians against Indonesians, of savage human rights violations, which are of importance
not as violations of some abstract norm, but as living experiences of hundreds of thou-
sands of people. Nobody, however, dared or dares to debate the ambivalent features of the
heroic anti-colonial revolution. The violence of the enemy – that is the Dutch –could be
seen as a first-rate traumatising experience. Even after their defeat, the Dutch provided
the symbolic enemy in a large number of wars fought by the leaders of the young Repub-
lic: from the war against the independence-oriented South Moluccas in 1950 to the incor-
poration of Dutch-controlled Irian Barat (West Papua) in the early 1960s. Indonesian
politics throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s were fixated with the arch enemy,
the Dutch.
A similar logic applies to the great killings of 1965/66. Even now, after nearly four
decades and the complete breakdown of the socialist or communist alternative to democ-
racy and capitalism, communism is still anathema to the political class of Indonesia.
What is the political class afraid of these days? Legalising communists would not only
mean, that the killings in effect were illegal, it would also throw the fiction of novelty and
innocence surrounding the new forces which emerged after the demise of Suharto open to
question. Where were the Banser-militia28 in 1965? What role did the student and espe-
26 Clark McCauly, The Psychology of Group Identification and the Power of Ethnic Nationalism, in:
Daniel Chirot, Martin E.P. Seligman (eds.), Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possi-
ble Solutions (Washington DC: American Psychological Association), 2001, pp. 343-362, citation p.
349.
27 This category might as well be applied to societal sub-groups. So the future behavior of the Papua
should be to a large degree determined  by their past traumatic experiences with the Indonesian security
forces. If this determination is simply on the basis of lessons learned from a traumatic past or an expres-
sion of traumatising experiences, it must be evaluated by research. There is no determinism from expe-
rience to the way of coping. As I have argued, not all traumatic experiences evolve into a trauma, the
way these experiences are integrated into the groups themselves and their worldview is always singular.
28 The Barisan Serba Guna (Banser), founded in 1964, is the militia of the largest Muslim organisation
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The initial purpose was to be able to counter the activities of the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI). This militia seems to have been heavily involved in the slaughtering which
commenced only one-and-a-half years later. Other similar organisations with an old history are the K -
mando Kesiapsiagaan Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah (Kokam), the Vigilance Command of Muham-
madiyah Youth, which provided protection for the reformist Islamist Muhamadiyah (founded in 1965)
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cially Christian organisations play in the violence? What about the other militias sup-
ported by political parties and societal groups? All contemporary political players, not
only the security forces, base their pretensions toward morality on very shaky ground. A
further case in point would be the South-Molukkas, where we might speak of a double-
traumatisation. For the Christians, the victory of the Republic over the Dutch amounted to
a fundamental trauma, as they, with one stroke of history, not only lost their privileged
position, but (at least in their own perception) feared for their sheer survival. Revolt and
violent suppression followed, clearly demonstrating, that their future status was at the
mercy of the central government. When in the 1990s the tide seemed to turn against
Christian interests the old trauma was revived. What might have been interpreted in the
context of a changing and modernising Indonesian society, was instead interpreted in the
context of an assault on the already besieged position of the Christian community and
their vested interests. From the point of view of the Muslim population of the southern
Molukkas, however, the processes of the 1990s were nothing more than a belated recog-
nition of the demographic changes which had reframed the political and economic envi-
ronment, in which Molukkan politics took place. Christian fears and efforts to stabilise
their societal position, however, were interpreted in the schemata of the late colonial and
early republican era, too. Here, religious aggressiveness, the missionary drive and the
history of Christian support for the colonial power and the later effort at secession com-
bined to provide the interpretation for the situation of the late 1990s. In the Moluccas, the
cognitive, interpretative and emotive patterns of the early 1950s had been partly frozen
for the past four decades and were brought to prominence under the conditions of re-
gional state failure.
2.3. Coping with competing narratives
Although we may assume that collective conflicts, as any kind of social interaction, were
due to some kind of real causes, in a large number of cases these causes have been differ-
ent for different groups of players and audiences and, more importantly, they often vanish
as action-driving forces after a short period of violent conflict. What essentially drives
action and re-action are assumptions about causes and links, interpretations of past ac-
and the now infamous Pemuda Pancasila, which originally had been founded as a resource for Su-
karno’s IPKI during the era of Guided Democracy. After the return to democracy in 1998/1999, the
newly-founded parties had nothing better to do than establish their own forces to be able to compete
with their competitors. The NU-affiliated Muslim PKB, for example, founded the Garda Pemuda Partai
Kebangkitan Bangsa (G rda Bangsa). Megawatis PDI-P as well as all the other parties can count on the
services of various shades of so-called task forces (Satuan Tugas – Satgas). All of them receive some
kind of (at least rudimentary) para-military training and style themselves in a rather narcissistic outfit
signifying force and violence. Most of them “opt for an army-style uniform. … In many cases boots and
dark sunglasses complete the outfit. The PDI-P Satgas members dress in black and wear a red beret or
some other form of headgear. … The Pemuda Pancasila members dress in an orange and black-striped
camouflage. The Kokam use green stripes and a green beret.” (van Dijk. see above (Footnote 2), pp.
159-160).
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tions. Whereas in cooperative relationships assumptions about causes and interpretations
of past events might be developed as the shared beliefs of all parties to the relationship,
the same processes are antagonistic and conflicting in non-cooperative conflicts. Causes
and interpretations of the conflict are part of the conflict themselves as is the discourse on
the rules of conflict-resolution.29
These different and competing narratives direct further interpretation and social ac-
tion. It is not some objective reality, but the told and retold narratives, not so much the
enclosed history, but the images, beliefs and values ingrained in these stories that provide
the fundamental fall-back position to the parties in conflict, from which they perceive,
judge and decide courses of action. Therefore, these narratives always carry a large load
of emotional attachment and power.
I argue that the “real” causes of conflict are of negligible importance to the players
and should only be of secondary importance for the observer interested in conflict resolu-
tion. They clearly have to be integrated in any analysis of the conflict, insofar as process-
tracing, that is a reconstruction of the transformation of the frames of reference applied to
the conflict by the parties over time, has to be founded and juxtaposed to all other avail-
able avenues of explanation. They should, however, only be given prominence to this
extent, as they still pertain to the conflict-related self-image and other-image of the par-
ties. Instead, the often competing narratives30 constructed and believed by the parties to
the conflict are of prime importance to the future relationship of the groups locked in
protracted conflict. Violent conflict is, I would argue, not only caused by causes, as con-
ventional wisdom would have it, but in the course of narrative production also produces
its own causes.
Even if we accept for a moment that knowing the real causes of a conflict would be of
some importance to its eventual resolution, we ought to realise that we should neverthe-
less not try to teach the “truth” to the parties to the conflict. Trying to convince people
that they believe in the wrong causes is not a very encouraging strategy of conflict reso-
lution, because people seldom listen, if told that their worldview is patently wrong. This
strategy, for simple psychological reasons, will not work. Instead, we have to take the
narratives developed and kept alive by the competing communities seriously.
29 This puts limitations on the endeavour of any scientist, who sets out to discover the real causes and
processes of violence. In a fascinating effort at juxtaposing competing narratives of violence in North
India, Paul Brass concludes, that we “can chart the interpretations, the contextualizations, the discourses
of, by, and about violence and communalisms in India and the interests served by different representa-
tions of them, but we cannot certainly find the truth of events. It is a curious thing to have reached such
a point, that the lies, the distortions, and the approximations to some truth have a greater reality – a ver-
ity that can be documented precisely – than the events themselves.” (Paul R. Brass, Theft of an Idol:
Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence, Princeton N.J. (Princeton University
Press), 1997, p. 266).
30 On the phenomenon of competing psychocultural narratives, see, for example, Marc Howard Ross, The
Political Psychology of Competing Narratives: September 11 and Beyond. in:
http://www.ssr.org/sept11/ essays/ross_text_only.htm
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To come to grips with mutually hostile narratives we have to bear in mind that, al-
though they build on past events and pre-existing narratives, there is always a wide vari-
ety of alternative narratives which might have been developed out of the same symbolic
reservoir, the dominant narratives used as quarry for the dominant versions of reality. We
have to acknowledge that the existing narratives, as dysfunctional in terms of conflict
resolution as they might be, fulfil a real purpose for the members of the groups who be-
lieve in them. All narratives, even ones from the perpetrators of violence, have to be
treated seriously, because they help us understand their emotional “’hot spots’; narratives
not only promote understanding of the deeper roots of complex conflicts; they also point
towards opportunities for strategic intervention and identify barriers to change.”31 Psycho-
cultural efforts at conflict resolution aim at understanding this subcutaneous agenda of
narratives and try to model the reaction in such a way that the fears and emotions are not
negated but taken up and expanded upon, that fears are connected to new and positive
emotions emphasising sameness, so that eventually the salience of different elements is
influenced in such a way that a de-escalating and integrative symbolism grows in impor-
tance. In this way, peace work in workshops or in local inter-ethnic groups aims at the
revaluation of central values, core assumptions and fundamental attributions und ulti-
mately reconciliation. So, there should be no denying of existing narratives. Instead, they
should be supplemented and broadened so that in due course these narratives include a
growing amount of information, emotion, meaning and symbolic structures which coun-
teract the centrifugal, confrontational symbolical and emotional content by adding int-
grative aspects to the conflict and the relationship between the parties to the conflict.
Therefore, the accusations and arguments brought forward by contending parties during
times of violence should clearly not be relegated to the sidelines and interpreted as aber-
rations from an otherwise more peaceful normalcy.
One Indonesian example of the need to take the problematic of competing narratives
seriously is the inter-ethnic violence which, on several occasions, broke out in West Ka-
limantan. Although the waves were separated by several decades, they followed a similar
pattern, the perpetrators were the same, the victims however different. The first accounts
of inter-ethnic violence can be found in the 19th century (1851-54, 1885), when the
Dayaks were used by the Dutch and their Malay allies to fight unruly Chinese kongsis.
The next prominent case of significant anti-Chinese violence dates from 1967, when the
‘‘Dayak Raids’ ... not only drove the Chinese agriculturalists from the rural areas of Kal-
bar, but directly or indirectly resulted in the death of thousands.”32 T e urviving Chinese,
driven out of their homesteads, did not return. In their stead, Madurese arrived in the
course of official and spontaneous transmigration over the following decades. These, in
fundamental contrast to other immigrant groups (e.g. the Bugis) could not be integrated
well into local society and, within a short time, conflicts proliferated. The persistent ten-
31 Ibid.
32 Mary Somers Heidhues, Kalimantan Barat 1967-1999: Violence on the periphery, in: Ingrid Wessel,
Georgia Wimhöfer (eds). Violence in Indonesi,. Hamburg (Abera), 2001, pp. 139-159, citation p. 141.
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sions which characterised the inter-ethnic relations33 exploded in early 1997, when
“Dayaks waged what appeared to be a ritual war against Madurese communities, burning
houses, killing inhabitants, and in some cases severing the heads and eating the livers of
those killed.”34
Any attempt at resolving this problematic of recurring violence, has to take into ac-
count the fact that the different players and analysts provide fundamentally different nar-
ratives of the incidents and thereby situate them in completely different meaning struc-
tures, which cannot be reconciled. A large number of social scientists and most interna-
tional NGOs, wary of the ethno-cultural dimension, interpret the conflict in terms of eco-
nomic, social and political marginalisation. For them, the conflict is “a classic example of
economic tensions manifested as ethnic tensions”.35 Others argued that “fear of innova-
tion and the dislocations of a time of transition were behind the various outbreaks of
1997, but there are problems with applying (t)his transition model to Kalimantan.”36 Most
analysts come up with multiple variables which, in their specific interplay, are said to be
able to account for the violence. So, Mary Somers Heidhues brings the factors to ether:
· disenfranchisement of a group that sees itself as the original inhabitants
· increased competition for scarce resources
· a shrinking economic cake
· a political culture that rewards violence
· absence of a single standard of law and ethics for the nation
· myths of head-taking and martial traditions.37
Representatives of the Dayak community point out that the economic argument “is
wrong”38. John Bamba, representing the Institut Dayakologi, argues that “whilst the mar-
ginalisaton of the Dayak through the development and political process is a factor that
can not be overlooked, it is interesting to note that you never hear a Dayak talk about the
conflict in those terms.” He argues that there certainly is a coincidence of economic and
political marginalisation and violence but no causal relationship. Purporting to speak for
33 Local and regional peace “treaties” abound; most prominent is the government sponsored Samalantan
agreement of 1979.
34 Human Rights Watch, Communal Violence in West Kalimantan. (http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/
wkali/Brneo97d-01.htm.).
35 According to Michael Dove, Dayak Anger Ig ored, in: Inside Indonesia No. 51, July/September 1997,
page 13. This line of reasoning is also present in the already cited Report of Human Rights Watch, ibid.
36 Somers Heidhues see above (footnote 32), p. 147.
37 Somers Heidhues, see above (footnote 32), p. 147. For a similar study which tries to integrate structural
and cultural features see Syarif Ibrahim Alqadrie, Factors in Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Identity and Con-
sciousness, and the Indications of Disintegrative Processes in West Kalimantan, in: Chaider Bamualim,
Karlina Helmanita (eds.), Communal Conflict in Indonesia, Jakarta (IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta;
KAS), 2002, pp. 125-153.
38 This and the following citations are all from: John Bamba. The Role of Adat in the Dayak and Madurese
War. (paper presented at the INFID conference in Bonn 1998), http://www.dayakology.com/ publica-
tions/articles_news/eng/role.htm.
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the Dayak community, he paints a fundamentally different picture, gives completely dif-
ferent meaning structures to the conflict and develops a narrative, which has nothing in
common with the other (“rational”) discourses on the conflict. He argues that reports
generally have “presumed the presence of rational thought, people acting with intent and
logic in an irrational manner, and on the basis of those actions being labelled as ‘head-
hunters’ and ‘cannibals’. The more liberal approaches presume a return to ‘traditional’
means as a last resort response to oppression.” He continues however, that these inter-
pretations are wrong because they do not grasp the motivational logic of the Dayak ac-
tion: “The bloody conflict with the Madurese did not arise out of revenge, nor ethnic
cleansing. It came about as the need for the Dayak to fulfil the obligations and demands
of the adat, or indigenous laws. Failure to do so would have resulted in great misfortune
being experienced by the whole Dayak community.” So, for the Dayak, there is an abso-
lute duty to fulfil the demands of a at, which under any circumstances may not be com-
promised, even in the face of state law.39
“However, the Madurese are not prepared to accept the Dayak adat, and in fact belittle it.
Failure to fulfil the adat process brings great misfortune upon the community concerned.
One way to free the village from the consequences of not carrying out the dat s to take the
burden of the adat on to their own shoulders. By killing the Madurese, and through that
war, the Dayak have the reason to perform the adat. In this case, the killing of Madurese is
not for purposes of revenge, but the need to fulfil the adat demands.”40
The interpretative lack of agreement is significant for conflict resolution, insofar as from
the Dayak point of view, conflict resolution has only marginal connections to the better-
ment of their economic and political situation. They point to a rearrangement of the re-
spective role of state law and adat instead: “It can be assumed that, should Madurese
persons who transgress Dayak adat, whether through taking the life of a Dayak or other-
wise, are prepared to accept the demands of the indigenous law that prevails, then there
would not be any need for a war against the Madurese.” If this interpretation were true for
the Dayak, then, no effort at betterment of their economic and social position could hin-
der a recurrence of violence, should the need to fulfil a at arise again.
39 This is corroborated by the ethnologist Masri Sareb Putra, who, without belittling the role of economic
marginalisation argues that the cultural differences between the Dayak and the Madurese play a centre
role. He, too, argues that customary law must reign supreme and the non-acceptance of customary law
by the Madurese, that is their taking recourse to state law, lay at the root of the problem of the riots.
When a group of Madurese migrants killed a Dayak, to the Dayak it was precisely the “failure to settle
this issue on the basis of customary law (which; P.K.) made the cries of war unavoidable. The chef of
the Dayaks issued ‘a red bowl’, indicating declaration of war, which had to be passed on to the war
commander of each tribe. As soon as the red bowl was received, all Dayaks joined forces to fight
against the attackers.” (Masri Sareb Putra, The Solution to the Sambas riots, in: The Jakarta Post 20
April 1999, (http:www.thejakartapost.com/). For a similar argument, see Setia Budhi, Unresolved and
chronic problems led to Sampit riot (The Jakarta Post 3 March, 2001; http://www.thejakartapost.com/)
40 This interpretation is theorised by some anthropologists, who perceive the conflicts to have been “ef-
forts by the local natives to cleanse their cultural domain from the pollutants” and thereby “regain their
cultural rights of control over their traditional lands and spaces” (Parsudi Suparlan, Ethnic and Religious
Conflict in Indonesia, in: Kultur Vol. 1 No. 2, 2001, pp. 41-57, citation p. 55).
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2.4. Instruments of psychological reframing
Even if the analytical power of psychological analysis is great, the number and efficacy of
tools for reframing the psychocultural patterns of competing narratives and drama are
limited. Time and time again, peace and conflict research led to the same few instruments
of workshops, peace camps, peace education in one form or the other.
Prominent designs of conflict resolution techniques which centre on the psychological
or psychocultural dimension are:
· the classical strategy of “interactive conflict resolution” (ICR) developed by Burton,41
· the analytical approach of Mitchell and Banks,42
· the psychoanalytically-inspired workshops developed by Vamik Volkan and the team
of the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (University of Virginia),43
· the method of interactive problem-solving of Herbert Kelman44
· Paul Lederach’s efforts to develop an integrated framework for peace-building.45
In all these strategies, workshops play a crucial role. A constant feature of all ap-
proaches is their reliance on an initiating, guiding, mediating and controlling third party.
Consequently, several of the authors have constructed elaborate handbooks on the design
of such workshops and the appropriate steps from the diagnosis and the selection of par-
ticipants to the arrangements and conduct of such workshops and the eventually neces-
sary follow-up work.46 Several problems and/or limitations are common to all efforts:
41 Burton initially called this a “controlled-communication workshop”. See: John W. Burton, Conflict
Resolution and Prevention, New York (ST. Martin's Press), 1990, and Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict:
A Handbook, Lanham Md. (University Press of America), 1987 by the same author.
42 See: Christopher Mitchell, Michael Banks, Handbook of conflict resolution: the analytical problem-
solving approach, London (Pinter), 1996.
43 Vamik Volkan, The Tree Model: Psychopolitical Dialogues and the Promotion of Coexistence, in:
Eugene Weiner (ed.), The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence, New York (Continuum), 1998, pp.
343-368, Volkan, see above (footnote 20).
44 Herbert C. Kelman, Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner, in: Eugene Weiner (ed.) The Hand-
book of Interethnic Coexistence, New York (Continuum), 1998, pp. 310-331. On the foundational so-
cial-psychological perspective, see: Herbert C. Kelman, Social-Psychological Dimensions of Interna-
tional Conflict, in: I. William Zartman, J. Lewis Rasmussen (eds.), Peacemaking in International Con-
flict: Methods & Techniques, Washington D.C. (United States Institute of Peace Press), 1997, pp. 191-
237.
45 Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures, Syracuse N.Y. (Syracuse
University Press), 1995; see also: Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies,
Washington D.C. (United States Institute of Peace Press), 1997 and: Beyond violence: Building Sus-
tainable Peace, in: Eugene Weiner (ed.), The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence, New York (Contin-
uum) 1998, pp. 236-245 by the same author.
46 See for example: Mitchell/Banks see above (footnote 42).
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The workshops did not work well on the macro- or meso-levels of conflict. The cru-
cial cases reported by most of the prominent practitioners – e.g. Sudan, Israel-Palestinian
conflict, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and suchlike – quite clearly cannot be counted as
success stories. In all of these cases, conflicts continued in spite of sometimes enduring
intervention and repeated efforts to devise solutions through the proposed avenues and
arenas. As all literature on the efficacy of workshops, peace camps and other forms of
peace education shows, these mechanisms might be useful on the micro-level only.47
Workshops and similar instruments generally take effect only when the magnitude of
violence has been reduced already. It is, as Donald Horowitz argues “easy to show that
the disposition to engage in such activities is the result, rather than the cause, of a conflict
already gone soft.”48 That is: at the height of violence, nobody will participate in conflict
resolution exercises. So, these strategies might be important in the aftermath of de-
escalation, but they clearly do not help to change the path of violence.
The psychologically-oriented workshop recipes focus on fundamental psychological
reframing which is based on a vision of positive peace. Aiming at and working towards
fundamental value and attitudinal change can prove to be counter-productive, however,
because it may lead to a corresponding neglect of short-term symptom or repression-
oriented strategies which only try to build a negative peace. Operating solely from the
premise that lasting civilisation of conflict behaviour is only feasible, if the value systems
of the groups in conflict are significantly altered, may well be a road to nowhere, because,
to cite Horowitz again: “many people will die as they wait for value change.”49 So, psy-
chological approaches clearly need additional measures which make a difference in the
short term.
Workshops and related instruments also do not account for cultural differences. They
basically propose one type of resolution mechanism for all kinds of societies and cultures.
Avruch rightly criticises the fact that specialists in psychologically-oriented conflict
resolution “codify, systematize, and administer. They create rules and compile rule-
books. They privilege a particular discourse.”50 In essence, they start from a basis of de-
47 The problem seems to be that up to now, there has been no promising strategy for spreading the cogni-
tive changes reached at the individual and small-group level. As Argyris and Schön point out with re-
spect to organisations, organisational learning, in order to occur, cannot only rely on learning agents –
i.e. individual members of the organisation. The new discoveries, inventions, interpretations, and
evaluations must be embedded in organisational memory. If the new schemes, images and evaluations
are not encoded in the organisational map, then “the individual will have learned but the organization
will not have done so” (Chris Argyris, Donald Schön, Organizational learning: A theory of action per-
spective, Reading, Mass. (Addison Wesley), 1978, p. 19.
48 Donald Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London (University of California
Press), 2001, p. 514.
49 Horowitz, see above (footnote 48), p. 514.
50 Kevin Avruch, Introduction: Culture and Conflict Resolution. In: Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, Joseph
A. Scimecca, Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. Westport Con, London, 1991, 1-17, ci-
tation p. 5. Lederach, who openly argues that conflicts and their resolution are always cultural events, is
one of the few exceptions. Even he, however, treats culture as a negligible category in his proposals for
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vising conflict resolution as a rational process, which aims at disclosing the uncon-
sciously held bases of collective self and inter-ethnic perception by a standardized se-
quence of prescribed steps. It is exactly this paradigm of process-rationality which might
collide with local practices under certain circumstances and at least, in certain cases, re-
sult in a return of violence and not its demise.
This short view on the main instruments makes clear that psychologically oriented
theory, while being able to provide much input for the analysis of conflict genesis and
dynamics, provides only a very small spectre of conflict resolution techniques, which, on
top of that, seem to work best on the local level and after the conflict has already gone
soft. Even if they play a significant role in the drawn-out processes of reconciliation,
healing and the re-integration of fragmented societies in the aftermath of violence, they
provide no viable avenue for the initial de-escalation of hardened intractable conflicts.
Consequently, the use of psychological avenues for conflict resolution should be of inter-
est in all inter-communal conflicts where the lines of confrontation have already gone
soft, but the multiple underlying forces still exist. Work on traumata, empathy-training
and the re-imagination of commonalities as well as dividing lines is essential, if the very
real danger of a return of violence is to be averted It is also important in high tension
areas as a preventive measure. Seen from a long-term perspective, it is primarily impor-
tant for the arenas of commonality and communication built up on this basis to be broad-
ened and converted into an institutionalised form in which all groups in conflict develop a
common interest.
3. Institutional approaches to the mitigation of ethnic conflict
Most of the ethno-conflict literature centres on the interplay of political structure, institu-
tional design and ethnic violence. Institutional approaches, in the words of Donald
Horowitz, try to steer a “realistic” course between
“the naiveté of those who would abolish ethnic differences in short order through ‘nation-
building,’ the cynicism of those who would simply suppress those differences, and the pes-
simism of those who would counsel costly and disruptive partition as the only way out … .
They entail measures to contain, limit, channel, and manage ethnic conflict, rather than to
eradicate it or to aim at either a massive transfer of loyalties or the achievement of some
consensus. They involve living with ethnic differences and not moving beyond them. All of
these measures fall within the domain of political engineering. Not learning theory, but the
theory of political incentives, inspires these more limited measures.”51
building peace. This is the more surprising as in his own studies on Latin American conflict resolution
he acknowledged a prominent place for culture in the process of conflict resolution. See esp.: Of Nets,
nails, and Problems: The Folk Language of Conflict Resolution in a Central American Setting. In:
Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, Joseph A. Scimecca, Conflict Resolution: Cross-cultural perspectives,
Westport Conn (Praeger), 1991, 165-185 by the same author.
51 Donald Horowitz, see above (footnote 5), pp.599-600.
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The basic argument is that the structures of societies determine to a large degree the
salience of the ethnic question and the development of inter-ethnic conflict. Institutional
design, however, can aggravate ethnic lines of contention It can also, however, mitigate
conflict and even be employed as a problem-solving device. As societal structures are
hardly amenable to purposeful change, these authors advise institution-oriented strategies,
which are supposed to maximise incentives for cooperation as well as the costs of non-
cooperative behaviour. They hope eventually to be able to provide a menu of strategies
providing the violence-stricken societies with political systems, which enable them to
reframe conflict in a non-antagonistic, more accommodative mode. None of these strate-
gies supposes that the political players have to live up to some kind of extraordinary mo-
rality. They all start from the premise that political players try to maximise power, wealth
and influence and the political system has to be designed in such a way as to make this
competition fruitful and non-exclusive.
Beyond this commonality, however, clear-cut differences with respect to premises,
analysis as well as prescriptions can be seen between two competing perspectives. One
tradition – consociational power-sharing – is connected with the name of Arendt Lijphart.
The other tradition – integrative power-sharing – has been advocated by Donald Horowitz
in the now classical study on “Ethnic groups in conflict” (1985).
3.1. Consociational and integrative strategies for the resolution of ethno-cultural con-
flict juxtaposed
Both traditions of institutional engineering commence from the same idea, that democ-
racy is not only the most peaceful political order, but it is also an order superior to all
others because it manages and resolves conflicts in a civilised and participate way. So,
democratic governance should be universalised. At the same time, however, we have to
realise, as both traditions argue, that certain types of democracy and democratisation can
lead to violence, to death and destruction in plural societies. Therefore, under certain
societal constraints, only some types of democracy are feasible instruments for civilising
conflict behaviour and erasing violence, whereas others might even exacerbate violence.
It all comes down to the concrete “architecture of democracy”52. In relegating majori-
tarian democracy to the sidelines, both approaches argue unanimously that one of its con-
stituent features – majority voting and decision-making – can lead to severe conflict in
societies with structural minorities. Should some ethnic groups predominate over others
by numbers, the minority groups are structurally marginalised, and therefore cannot hope
to achieve their will and safeguard their interests in the parliamentary process. At best,
they can fulfil the role of a permanent opposition – a nuisance to the ruling group, but
nothing more. Such societies should establish power-sharing arrangements which guar-
antee that all important societal groups (including small minorities) receive their share of
52 Andrew Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management
and Democracy, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2002.
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political power and can effectively counter all moves which threaten to undermine their
vital interests. Consociationalists and integrationalists are divided, however, as to the
means of this power-sharing and to the ends, which should be envisaged by power-
sharing practices.
Consociationalists argue that the plural nature of the societies can hardly be influenced
by political engineering. They point to the fact that there are hardly any examples of so-
cieties who have succeeded in overcoming their plural nature by taking recourse to pur-
poseful political design.53 Therefore consociational power-sharing is ready to accept the
plural structure of society and a corresponding structuration of the political process. From
this starting point, it sets out to devise institutional arrangements which maximise coop-
eration and participation of the groups in conflict.
As in plural societies, the elites of the competing societal groups do play a central role
in all efforts of violence reduction, political engineering should be used primarily to con-
struct an institutional setting which values inter-elite cooperation and inclusive bargain-
ing. Consociationalists argue that the options for cooperative inter-elite behaviour are
maximised if the following institutional features are put in place:
1. Governments should be based on a broad parliamentary majority (if possible, a grand
coalition).
2. All political players should be invested with a right to veto all decisions affecting their
fundamental interests.
3. All interests should be represented according to their respective strengths in all im-
portant political institutions on all levels as well as in the national and state admini-
strations.
4. Devising autonomy arrangements guaranteeing the highest possible degree of internal
self-rule should be a natural course of action.54 Granting group rights is perceived to
be a central means of managing the political process. Attractive solutions to end group
discrimination are not only territorial rights, but less-often-sought-for personal auton-
omy. Personal autonomy refers to all arrangements which give special rights and r-
sponsibilities to individuals on the basis of group membership. The foundation of per-
sonal autonomy rights lies in the principle of “rule by the minority over itself in the
area of the minority’s exclusive concern”55 The right of definition is to be vested in the
group itself and not in the state players. Any group which constitutes a group and is
legitimated by its group members at the polls has the right to lay claim to correspond-
ing autonomy arrangements.
53 To be sure, there are countries which did change from ethnicised to non-ethnic politics, however, this
has never been brought about by political engineering.
54 For a classical study of autonomy solutions, see Hurst Hanum, Autonomy, Sovereig ty, and S lf-
Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Right,. Philadelphia (University of Pennsylvania
Press), 1990.
55 Arendt Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, New Haven Conn (Yale University Press), 1977, p. 41.
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Integrationalists also opt for power-sharing arrangements, albeit only as temporary
solutions to the problem of ethnicised politics. They argue that these arrangements have
to be structured in such a way, that they remove their own raison d’être – the plural soci-
ety and its political expression, the ethnicised politics – in the long term.
Recipes for integrative power-sharing try to offer incentives for cooperative behaviour
not only on the elite level, but on the level of the larger public, too. Integrationists focus
their attention on the election system in order to produce arrangements “which fragment
support of one or more ethnic groups, ... induce interethnic bargaining; encourage the
formation of multiethnic coalitions; produce fluidity and a multipolar balance; and pro-
duce proportional outcomes.”56 They aim at implementing “electoral institutions that have
the potential for voting across ethnic lines and the election of candidates with perceived
obligations wider than their own ethnic group, or the creation of parties that are multi-
ethnic in character.”57 They thereby try to counteract the centrifugal forces of ethnicity
with strong centripetal tendencies arising from the design of the electoral system. These
approaches aim at minimising the importance of ethnicity for political life. They stress
the fundamental role of individual rights, which should be the only basis for insuring
group rights. Individual equality is the declared basis of political organisation.
Both approaches opt for federal solutions. They advocate fundamentally different
principles of federalisation, however. Whereas consociationalists favour solutions that
56 Timothy D. Sisk, Powershaing and International Mediation in ethnic conflicts, Washington D.C.
(United States Institute of Peace Press) 1996, p. 42.
57 Bernard Grofman, Robert Stockwell, Institutional Design in Plural Societies: Mitigating Ethnic Conflict
and Fostering Stable Democracy, (http://www.democ.uci.edu/democ/papers/stock.htm). In mainly tar-
geting the electoral systems, integrationists follow the lead of Sartori, who declared electoral systems to
be “the most specific manipulable instrument of politics” (Giovanni Sartori, Political Development and
Political Engineering, in: Public Policy, Vol. 17, 1968, pp. 261-298, citation p. 273; see also: Compara-
tive Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, New York (New
York University Press), 1994 by the same author).
In the view of the proponents of electoral engineering, “creatively-crafted electoral rules hold particular
promise, because they structure the incentives and pay-offs available to political players in their search
for electoral victory, making some types of behaviour more rewarding than others.” (Benjamin Reilly,
Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management, Cambridge, New
York (Cambridge University Press), 2001, p. 10. Consociationalists, however, are much more sceptical,
not concerning the point that the appropriate rules might be beneficial, but about the chances of directed
electoral engineering. They point to the fact that very often strong cultural opposition exists to certain
electoral designs and that empirically fundamental reforms of electoral systems are hardly ever ob-
served. So, electoral engineering seems possible on a rather modest degree only (Arend Lijphart, Elec-
toral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990. Oxford (Oxford
University Press), 1994). In the critics’ view, such an endeavour is bound to fail in all cases, where eth-
nicities are already politicised, because quite simply the incentive structure for the required consent of
the ethnic elites is lacking. McGarry and O’Leary, long-time observers of the conflict in Northern Ire-
land argue that the notion of a new non-ethnic electoral design is “fundamentally utopian, especially if
the relevant ethnic communities have already been mobilised behind different conceptions of national-
ism.” (John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary, Introduction, in: McGarry/O’Leary (eds.), The Politics of Eth-
nic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, London/New York (Routledge),
1993, pp. 1-40, citation pp. 21-22).
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follow ethno-cultural boundaries when drawing state boundaries, integrationists plead for
the opposite recipe. They argue that state boundaries should criss-cross ethnic settlement
patterns in order to open up fissures within ethno-cultural groups, which might be useful
in counterbalancing the deep cleavages between the groups.
In my view, it is important, however, to realise that the different and sometimes co-
tradictory avenues to conflict resolution offered by the two approaches should be inter-
preted not as a zero-sum game in which either consociational or integrative strategies
win, but in terms of a problem-solving exercise, in which the choice of means has to be
guided by detailed analysis of the concrete circumstances. Even if, in some cases, the
integrative approach seems most promising in others, consociational arrangements might
hold the key to success. In certain instances, an ingeniously-devised mixture of consocia-
tional and integrative institutions and practices might seem most advantageous. So, the
different measures should be treated like a menu, from which each has to select a specific
mixture of dishes according to his taste, his health and the peculiarities of his disease.58
Should some of the dishes prove to be indigestible, they have to be replaced with better
suited alternatives. That is, the process should be principled but incremental at the same
time. Deciding on concrete arrangements always involves an evaluation of the “optimal
tradeoffs between (a) making changes in those aspects of the incentive structures that are
most easily changed and (b) making changes where changes are likely to have the great-
est impact.”59 These two, however, seldom go together. For the case of Indonesia, how-
ever, in my view, two strategies aiming in different ways at the betterment of participa-
tion and representation seem to evolve rather naturally out of the above-sketched ap-
proaches: a) federalisation and b) enhanced group representation. To work as violence-
minimising devices, however, these measures have to be accompanied by c) a significant
strengthening of the state on all levels of politics.
3.2. Empowering the parts I: Federalising Indonesia
Both lines of reasoning within the institutionalist perspective argue that federal designs
bear important chances for mitigating ethno-cultural conflict in plural societies. Both
argue that in the case of complex multi-ethnic societies within territorially large states,
the concept of the unitary state with its very strong tendencies toward centralisation and
homogenisation, should not be seen as the first option for either successful state or na-
tion-building. It must be borne in mind, as Rupert Emerson stated in 1960, that: “the crux
of the matter in a plural society is that it is not one people which is determining itself but
two or more, and it should not be ignored that the United Nations Charter speaks in the
58 A rather comprehensive menu, from which one can choose is provided by the 1999 Lund Recommen-
dations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, which together with an Ex-
planatory Note can be obtained either from: Project Unit, Office of the High Commissioner on National
Minorities, The Hague, or by the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations.
59 Grofman/Stockwell, see above (footnote 57).
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same breath of self-determination and of the equal rights of peoples. If they are actually
to be equal, then the subordination of one to another is evidently ruled out.”60 One funa-
mental question must be answered in all plural societies, and the answer determines the
future fate of the state and society concerned to a large degree: “self-determination for
whom?”61. As Emerson clearly saw, it does not matter whether the state was manned by
colonial or indigenous elites, as long as it was a functioning autocracy, “the component
parts of a plural society may be able to live in a reasonable facsimile of peace with each
other, but the transition to self-government (read also: democracy; P.K.) raises immedi-
ately the question as to the ‘self’ which will be doing the governing.”62 C ntrary to Emer-
son, who stresses “lack of national unity” as one of the prime reasons for the democratic
as well as the national failure he observed more than four decades ago, it seams reason-
able to hold responsible not the social fact, but the avenues chosen for the resolution of
this problem.
Indonesia, since its inception, has, as the majority of newly-independent nations, co-
sistently opted for maximising the degree of centralisation in both nation and state-
building. The perceived “lack of national unity which … threatens disruption … is met by
enforced centralization.”63 Only in the last years of the Suharto era and especially during
the interregnum of Habibi, was a decisive turn toward devolution taken in respect of
state-building. Even if Indonesia is currently grappling with the sometimes dire unin-
tended consequences of the simultaneous devolution of political, administrative and eco-
nomic power, these problems in my view should not lead to a scaling-down or to a re-
trenchment of this policy. What is needed instead is an integration of these policies into a
fundamental long-term strategy for a federalisation of the unitary state. Indonesia ironi-
cally ought to turn back to the much despised Dutch concept of a federal state, associated
with the name of the Dutch Lt.-Governor H.J. van Mook, who advocated a dispropor-
tional representation of the non-Javanese areas at the Center and the development of a
host of “self-governing” institutions which would have guaranteed a high degree of local
and regional autonomy. It is true that these plans were designed to counter the Indonesian
Republic, they nevertheless contained a significant potential for participatory integration.
As they were put forward by the arch enemy however, they were treated as a mere strate-
gic device for continuing colonial control. Discussing their possible merits up to now has
been considered something like an indecent proposal. However, as now that more than
five decades have passed, it should be possible at last to discuss the chances and limita-
tions of a federal design in a more rational manner. Old battles need not be fought forever
– especially if the enemy has already left the trenches for decades.
60 Rupert Emerson. From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples.
Cambridge, Mass. (Harvard University Press), 1960, p. 330.
61 Ibid., p. 336.
62 Ibid., p. 342.
63 Ibid., p. 278.
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When, in 1998/1999, Indonesia embarked on the path of devolution and decentralisa-
tion, the policy was beset by serious flaws, as the district-level (kabupaten), rather than
the state or provincial level was strengthened. The reason for this was that strengthening
the provinces would eventually prove to be the first step toward the break-up of the Indo-
nesian state, and had therefore to be avoided. This argument suggests that the provinces,
once able to develop their own identity and formulate their regional interests, would quite
naturally opt for severing the ties to the Indonesian state.
This insinuation in itself gives some food for critical thought. If it was true, this would
mean that the Indonesian nation-state was of no use to the provinces, but merely a para-
site living from their riches. Then nothing would speak against the dissolution of the In-
donesian nation. However, the argument can also be turned upside down: If national-level
politics can provide important services for the regions, then any utility-based calculation
would lead to maintaining the Indonesian nation-state. In a first step, therefore, the way in
which the central state can be useful to the regions ought to be figured out. In such a dis-
cussion, questions of security, well-being, justice and development would loom large. A
needs-based discussion would, on the one hand, stress the principle of subsidiarity, but,
on the other hand, argue for the benefits of integration.
A second line of thought on the probable repercussions of federalisation would look
out for empirical evidence, from which the possible effects could be extrapolated in the
case of Indonesia. This cannot be pursued in detail here, but suffice it to say that in “real
world politics” there is only scant evidence of federalisation leading to secession. It might
be a tempting theoretical line of thought, empirically, however, there are no convincing
substantiations bearing out this theory.64 There are problematic cases: Nigeria and the
former Yugoslavia are cases in point. However, the break-up of Yugoslavia should, like
the similar demise of the Soviet Union, not be interpreted in the context of the weak-
nesses of federal arrangements, but in the context of the insufficiency of enforced nation-
building and the overlay of federal institutions by highly centralised patterns of rule and
an all-powerful Center (organised in one hierarchically-organised party).65
From a cognitive point of view, enhancing the rights of the regions should not be seen
in the context of an ad hoc answer to secessionist demands and granted on an exclusive
64 Prominent fed ral examples of Third World nation-building include Malaysia and India. Malay(si)a,
with its federal design, in 1963 even succeeded to enlarge the state territory and incorporate a significant
number of ethnic groups which had no ethnic affiliation with the major ethnic group. What prompted
their willingness to participate in the Malaysian experiment was the readiness on the part of the federal
level to grant significant rights to the regions and to safeguard the basic needs of all constituent groups
in the respective territories (see, for example, the constitutional provisions on language, religion, inter-
nal migration or representation on the federal level). Even if the ethnicised system of political represen-
tation might have serious drawbacks, it nevertheless guarantees a sufficient amount of recognition for
all ethno-political groups to make the option of secession seem non-attractive.
65 Nigeria might provide the most potent case against federalisation. I would argue, however, that a) Nige-
ria is a special case, b) without federalisation Nigeria might have either broken up or gone down the
path to perpetual civil war decades ago. For reasons of space, however, this case cannot be elaborated
upon in this paper.
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basis, but be promoted to a fundamental policy of the Indonesian state. In this way, oppo-
sition from other regions to preferential treatments of regions with pronounced seces-
sionist demands might be mitigated. Even if initially such a course might provoke fears of
the break-up the Indonesian state, in the medium term, the two principles of integration
and subsidiarity will show themselves to be non-antagonistic and supplementary. In a
federal system, a minority “at the Center may be a majority in one or more states and may
be in a position to rule these states, thereby mitigating its reduced influence or even ex-
clusion at the center.”66 In this way, federalisation might work as one device for the pro-
tection of structurally-handicapped minorities.
Moreover, the concrete logic of federation should develop out of the structuration of
the regions. In accordance with Horowitz, I argue that in regions where ethno-cultural
groups “are territorially separate and subethnic divisions are prominent, the case for an
ethnically homogeneous state is strong.”67 If, however, groups are intermixed, then feder-
alisation should aim at the creation of ethno-culturally heterogeneous states. In the first
case, the homogeneous character of the ensuing constituent states will lead to stronger
intra-ethno-cultural conflict and competition, thereby mitigating the inter-ethno-cultural
problematic. Heterogeneous states open up new avenues for inter-ethnic cooperation on
the state level, because the state elites will have to work together in order to maximise
common interests in the interaction with the federal government. With all these possible
options forced open by a strategy of federalisation, the possible costs should not be di-
counted. One first victim of federalisation may be national orientation, which might be
overpowered by growing parochialism. It must also be kept in mind that “devolution
agreements are difficult to reach and, once reached, soon abort.”68 Very often, the win-
dows of opportunity, which in the early stages of a conflict might still favour a common
future, close with the onset of violence. Experiences of violence often take their toll on
people’s readiness to continue to live together in the same political community. In such
cases only, a determined effort to grant the largest possible amount of autonomy and not
to withhold strategic rights of taxation and the allocation of fis l a d other resources has
a chance of success.
Federalisation can and should be accompanied by policies which bind the regions and
the center together. That is, even though large tracts of responsibility can be devolved to
the regions, the regions should have a strong presence at the center; they should be inte-
grated into federal decision-making, they should be able to make a difference if they en-
gage themselves at the national level and succeed in pooling their resources. A second
chamber representing regional interests with considerable power of veto and the power to
initiate national legislation is one possible answer to the need for regional representation
at the center. Another would be a strong representation of the more problematic regions in
the federal parliament. A third avenue could be to provide minority members from the
66 Horowitz, see above, (footnote 5), p. 617.
67 Horowitz, see above (footnote 5), p. 613.
68 Horowitz, see above (footnote 5), p. 623.
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outlying islands with enhanced opportunities for advancement in the centrally-
administrated public services: the armed forces, the police (if not devolved to the state
level) as well as the federal ministries and agencies. The more the regions are represented
on the federal level, the more likely it is that their representatives aim at working in the
system and not against it, as in the case of separation, they clearly would have something
to lose.
In the Indonesian context, the chances inherent in the federal option need a new ap-
proach toward party politics as well as the mobilisation of regional interests and their
representation on the federal level.
3.3. Empowering the parts II: Encouraging parliamentary representation
of regional, ethnic or religious interests within a consociational frame
of elite bargaining
In view of the already exorbitantly high number of some 200 existing political parties in
Indonesia, it might seem hazardous to propose a further chance for inflating their number.
Nevertheless, I deem a new option for the representation of purely regional interests to be
an exceedingly helpful device for defusing salient bonds of ethnic, religious or regionalist
interests and identity.
A future revision of the new party law should explicitly aim at channelling regional or
ethnic resentment into the fold of parliamentarian politics which allow for the establish-
ment of regional parties.69 These can try to win a significant share of regional power by
capturing enough seats in state assemblies. It must also be possible for them to press their
case at the federal level as long as they are successful with their respective constituencies.
It is legitimate for Acehnese to feel something of an Acehnese identity and to express
this in politics. If some Papua want to identify themselves as Papua and organise them-
selves accordingly, this must be possible for them. If regional parties are outlawed, if
ethnic parties are frowned upon, these sentiments cannot be expressed within the fold of
democratic parliamentarian politics. I would underline the argument of the Lund commis-
sion, which stressed that the right to form associations “includes the freedom to establish
political parties based on communal identities as well as those not identified exclusively
with the interests of a specific community.”70 Communal parties might be of decisive
importance because “in some situations such communal parties may be the only hope for
69 Chances for such a law however are slim, as a revised Bill on political parties has just been endorsed in
Parliament in early December 2002 by all factions. This Bill however “ensures that political parties will
remain Jakarta-centric ... . It ... leaves absolutely no room for debate about alternative forms of gover-
ment, like federalism” (Power to the status quo. In: The Jakarta Post, December 9, 2002). As the Bill re-
quires a party to be represented in at lest half of all provinces and in half of the regencies in these prov-
inces (Art. 2 (3)) and to establish its headquarter in Jakarta, local interests have no chance of autono-
mous political expression within the parliamentary system.
70 Lund Recommendations, see above (footnote 58), p. 8. (article 8).
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effective representation of specific interests and, thus, for effective participation.”71 Pres-
ently the avenues for discussion, the openings of the system for the input made by such
parties are heavily restricted, although they should be wide open to defuse anxieties and
enable participation. If regional interests on a communal base have no opportunity to
express themselves in parliamentary politics outside the vested national parties, then such
interests, if they are sufficiently marginalised, may become radicalised and turn to non-
parliamentarian ways of expression, often associated with various shades of violence.
Indispensable to such an endeavour of pluralisation – and here we turn to the cultural
dimension of conflict resolution – is a consensus on the basic rules of the democratic
game. If we follow the analysis of Freek Colombijn and other anthropologists, this might
be no small accomplishment as it would entail changing a pattern which seems quite
common in Indonesia, i.e. a “lack of willingness to accept a defeat received according to
established rules.”72 Having lost according to the rules, too often the contest is simply
carried on in other arenas, with other, non-consensual means.
If we accept the interpretation that the culture-based stress on conflict avoidance
(more on this in the following chapter) collides with institutional designs based on com-
petition – as democratic proceedings inevitably are – then we should think about precepts
which enable us to dampen these situations in which conflicts are managed in open con-
frontation.
Colombijn illustrates this problematic with recourse to football matches which are
“overt, unavoidable conflict in front of an audience”. In his interpretation, in such situa-
tions Indonesian “players quickly feel humiliated in public and the culturally prescribed
self-control breaks down.”73 Translated into the political realm, this problematic would
require either a reduction of conflict itself, or enhanced possibilities for its settlement
outside the public’s (audience’s) view, so that the contending parties could more easily a)
resort to cooperative practices and b) consider face-saving devices, whereby in the public
eye each decision is, at least symbolically, interpreted in terms of a win-win solution. The
functioning of such elite-centred consociational collaborative practices rests on several
basic requirements, a) that the fundamental needs of all elite groups have to be safe-
guarded and fulfilled and b) that every single group has a limited right of veto to stop all
measures which impinge on its basic needs and a corresponding obligation to use this
right sparingly, c) that the “elite cartel” is as inclusive as possible, and finally d) that,
irrespective of affirmative action, costs and benefits have to be divided up evenly – no
single group ever should have to shoulder deterioration as long as other groups improve
on their situation.
71 Explanatory Note to the Lund Recommendations, see above (footnote 58), p. 24
72 Freek Colombijn, What is so Indonesian about Violence?, in: Ingrid Wessel, Georgia Wimhöfer (eds.),
Violence in Indonesia. Hamburg (Abera), 2001, pp. 25-46, citation p. 33.
73 Colombijn, see above (footnote 72), both citations p. 36.
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One last caveat, which applies to the strategy of federalisation as well as to the en-
hancement of parliamentary representation of regional interests at the center, must be
mentioned: neither federalisation nor representation are recipes for good governance.
Decentralisation might be helpful to overcome violence, but it might as well reproduce
patterns of bad governance prevalent at the national level on the state and local levels of
politics. In contemporary Indonesia we find a political system “in which negotiation be-
tween societal and state players takes place at many different levels all the way from the
capital to the remotest village.”74 The institutional system of control as well as the pre-
vailing normative mindset, however, still follow authoritarian, hierarchical and center-
oriented patterns to a large degree. The missing piece between political practice and the
normative as well as institutional frame, in effect leads to large spheres of politics deter-
mined only by the exigencies of political power devoid of systemic control. If we, as van
Klinken rightly suggests, should “view the Indonesian state less as an autonomous, highly
centralized machine, and more as a multi-polar series of arenas of domination and resis-
tance”75 it might be of eminent use to give institutional form to these realities and thereby
slowly subject them to the rules inherent in any variant of the federal idea. So, in the In-
donesian case the rule set ought to follow the peculiarities and typical practices as there is
no chance of success, if it is tried the other way round. Neither Sukarno, nor Suharto were
able to maximise the potential of the centripetal, integralist state concept, they had put in
place. Both cases ended up with the worst of both – the authoritarian center-oriented and
the fragmented locally-centered – worlds.
However, decentralisation, federalisation and enhanced representation will, without
strong state institutions lead only half the way to violence reduction. They might even
provoke new violence, as new arenas and sinecures are made available for competing
elites. Therefore strengthening the state is, in tandem with the reform of its institutions on
all levels of politics, one of the central tasks of conflict-civilisation at the macro-level.
3.4. Reforming and strengthening the police while safeguarding its interests
The appropriate action against the security forces who in the past (and sometimes even in
the present) have been involved in heinous human rights violations should be most con-
troversial as it involves fundamental value judgements and aims at the normative center
of the rapid, political, administrative, economic and social transformation currently being
experienced by Indonesia. Over the past few decades, Indonesia saw a proliferation of
powerful agents of collective violence responsible for thousands, even hundreds of thou-
sands of fatalities, for innumerable cases of torture, rape, and the destruction of villages
as well as the physical and social environment. Most of these players profited from their
74 Gerrry van Klinken, Indonesia’s New Ethnic Elites, in: Henk Shulte Nordholt, Irwan Abdullah (eds.),
Indonesia: in Search of Transition, Yogyakarta (Pustaka Pelajar), 2002 (http://www.knaw.nl/indonesia/
transition/workshop/ws_trans01d.html).
75 Ibid., (footnote 74).
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acts of violence. They were active as extortionists, sold and smuggled drugs, mixed up
legal businesses with illegal practices and sometimes made fortunes on the sole basis of
their capacity for violence. Agents of violence comprise large parts of the armed forces
including special forces as Kopassus. They also include parts of the police force (for ex-
ample Brimob), which until recently were under the control of the armed forces.
But it is not only the state security apparatus which is to be denounced in this context.
We have to deal with a plethora of different players which, only to a small extent can be
conceived as part of or instruments of the authoritarian political system. What should we
do with all the militias and other armed groups which not only abound at the fringes of
the state apparatus but are equally present in the political system? On top of that, a host of
private business and societal groups with often rather questionable motives have built up
and maintain private guards and more or less armed groups of thugs. We should be wary
against simply victimising the security forces, as they are part of a larger system which
has to be exposed and reformed. Paul Brass’ comment on the situation in northern India
could equally be applied to Indonesia. He criticises the fact that “we do not have a simple
case only of the agents of an unjust state misusing their powers against innocent persons,
but a social system in which all are engaged in such actions. … we have a network of
power relations among police, criminals, and politicians in which the use of force and
violence is, if not routine, at least not something unexpected or exceptional.”76
The dominant practice of treatment concentrates on state violence and its agents, that
is the armed forces. Within this rather restricted range of action the urge to avenge the
victims and seek justice is concentrated on a small number of highly symbolic cases and
an equally small group of persons, which came to symbolise the evil of the old New Or-
der State.
I argue that this preoccupation might not only be counterproductive but also problem-
atic because it exonerates all other segments of society. Prosecuting a handful of generals
is an ideal strategy to externalise guilt and evil, without having to question motives and
typical patterns of action. After all, we should realise that, in the end, the police (but to a
certain degree also the armed forces) never had the chance to act professionally as they
were always perceived to be part of politics. On the one hand, they themselves postulated
a political role for themselves. On the other hand, all kinds of politicians, be it on the
national, regional or local level, expected them to act in a political way. In the authoritar-
ian system, this means taking the side of the power-holder. In the new system (as during
the times of Sukarno) this entails a process of taking sides. At present, there are several
competing centres of power, all of which aim at instrumentalising the security forces,
they have to take sides, they have to be political. Simply following orders does not suf-
fice. Obviously, their calculations cannot be oriented toward law or order in the first
place, but have to center on the relative power of the competing political groups. Simply
76 Brass, see above (footnote 29), pp. 274-275.
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punishing individual officers however neither changes the system nor the need of these
persons to calculate in political terms.
A look at the prevalent forms of violence shows a process of pervasive socialisation.
Whereas during the authoritarian era, the state was the single most important agent of
violence, this has been changed decisively in recent years. Now the vacuum of will and
capacity to use violence left by the unsettled security forces is rapidly filled by other
agents: party militias, private armies of politicians, businessmen and traditional leaders77,
who can provide money and opportunity, hybrid organisations somewhere between
community guard and organised crime and a plethora of outright criminal organisations.
To be sure, the modern Indonesian state never enjoyed the monopoly of violence. Un-
der Sukarno as well as Suharto, the state was inevitably compromised by regular recourse
and voluntary as well as forced cooperation with societal agents of violence. Large tracts
of this hybrid violence were enclosed in a structured environment, which at times led to
the escalation of violence, if the regime deemed it necessary to do so. And yet, violence
was also partly contained in a process of rational consideration. Violence was limited if it
was deemed dysfunctional. This limitation inherent in the authoritarian structuration of
violence broke down with the demise of the autocratic system without being replaced by
an alternative civilised structuration for the handling of conflict. The new political players
continued a political style which rested on the will and ability to use violence, if deemed
necessary. They, without exception, maintained their private militias, new political parties
established security guards, which over time came to resemble the forces of the estab-
lished organisations, albeit on a smaller scale.
At present, state agents of violence are delegitimised – their loss of status, prestige and
respect is overwhelming – whereas the corresponding societal agents of violence not only
continue to function, but even thrive in the democratic political system. Therefore, the
partial monopoly on violence by the state is further undermined not only on the level of
political action, but also in the area of belief and social order.
Three further arguments speak against the prominence given to taking a handful of
generals to court. For one: the strategy will not work, as practically none of them will be
convicted. As long as the leader of the former system Suharto is sacrosanct, prosecuting a
few of his lieutenants leaves a rather bitter aftertaste. The light sentences will fuel public
annoyance and further the delegitimation of state institutions.
The second more important argument aims at the destructive potential of the targeted
elites. They are part of extensive networks which accommodate immense potential for
spoiling any agreements or progress made in one or more of the multitude of regional
conflicts. Any general who is targeted in the course of efforts to secure criminal responsi-
bility can, and some certainly will, muster significant amounts of coercive power, with
which to disrupt the often fragile peace and orderliness of public life.
77 Consider the sudden appearance of private armies fighting for the competing Sultans of Tidore and
Ternate in the northern Moluccas.
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A last objection to taking legal action centres on the need for state-strengthening and
especially on the need to regain state control of violence. Any state – be it democratic or
authoritarian – must rely on its security apparatus for the task of protecting citizens
against threats from within and without the society. As long as the state does not want to
privatise the control over inner security and open up large tracts of society to the rule of
local strongmen he has to strengthen state capacity to assert the rule of law against resis-
tance if necessary. In Indonesia, the only instruments which might eventually be able to
achieve this are the much resented security forces. Semi-private forces so far have failed
miserably in modern Indonesian history. Proof of this are the efforts of the early 1980s,
when the Indonesian police force started an experiment by instrumentalising paramilitary
gangs, militias and the forces of local strongmen in order to enhance public security.78
Youths were provided with some rudimentary training, they were given official titles such
as members of Pam Swakarsa (that is security guards). The aim was twofold: a) to better
“control the gangs and a variety of organisations that had appropriated the task of neigh-
bourhood protection” and b) “to discourage acts of communal violence against suspected
thieves, sorcerers, and adulterers”79. The results proved to be contrary to expectations,
however. On the one hand, lynchings and other forms of mob revenge were not reduced
by the new means. On the other hand, it soon became obvious that the gangs were not
infiltrated by the police, that the militias were not disciplined and converted into orderly
security guards safeguarding neighbourhoods, but that the police were corrupted, and the
state security apparatus and organised crime had become mixed up. There is no shortcut
to police control and state-guarded security. Any effort to instrumentalise societal groups
compromises institutional integrity and aims, and runs the risk of being exploited for
private interests.
If above I argued that Indonesia is in dire need of better regional representation, I
would now like to add that this strategy can only work, if the state institutions, foremost
among them the police apparatus, are strengthened on all levels especially that of the
state. Decentralisation and representation without strong state institutions can only lead
part the way to violence reduction. In certain cases, it might even provoke new violence,
as new arenas and sinecures are made available for competing elites. We should keep in
mind that Indonesia, contrary to public perception, has the lowest policemen per capita
ratio in the regional context of Southeast Asia.80 Police forces must be strengthened two-
fold: in terms of quality as well as quantity.
78 This strategy was devised in the context of a newly developed system for guaranteeing local security in
urban as well as in rural areas, which came to be called Siskamling (Sistem Keamanan Lignkungan, En-
vironment Security System). Within this concept, public security should be enhanced by empowering
local citizens “who were given the task of guarding their own village or neighbourhood” and integrated
into a institutional form, which was called the Voluntary Security Guards (Pasukan Pengamanan Swa-
karsa, short: Pam Swakarsa) (citation see: van Dijk, see above (footnote 2), p. 155).
79 both citations from: van Dijk, see above (footnote 2), p. 155.
80 In 1994 we find the following ratios: Hong Kong 1:220; Thailand: 1:228; Malaysia: 1:249, Singapore:
1: 295; New Zealand: 1:416; Japan: 1:563; Philippines: 1. 665, Indonesia: 1.1,119 (Joshua Barker, State
Options for the resolution of violent ethno-cultural conflicts in Indonesia33
Ultimately, security has to be entrusted to state security forces. If they are deprived of
a significant section of their leadership, if they are constantly criticised for their failures
and shortcomings, then their social prestige and the status of their members will suffer.
For members of the services, incentives are not forthcoming, new recruits tend to be low
quality, as the social prestige of the job is low, so they will tend to look for immediate
opportunistic gratifications, as no symbolic gratifications (honour, social status, prestige)
are apparent. In the end the cycle of violence, incompetence, arbitrariness, and corruption
will continue. What is sorely needed is an enhancement of the social status of security
forces. This has to be accompanied with, on the one hand, a betterment and regularisation
of their payments and, on the other hand, a sustained effort toward the development or (in
the case of the armed forces) the reconstruction of a organisational culture, which centres
on a leitmotif of public service.
This is clearly a long-term perspective. In the short and medium term, the task is to
regularise the behaviour of the security services and provide them with incentives for the
cognitive and behavioural changes expected of them. For the old guard, this must not
mean prosecution but retirement. Even though it might legitimately be argued that a good
number of men certainly do not deserve a regular pension, political opportunism and the
urge to overcome the system built up and held alive by these men, should provide enough
incentives to swallow the bitter pill. It makes sense to make them neither heroes nor
martyrs, but to let them sink into oblivion. Otherwise, as martyrs or heroes, they will
continue to influence the future history of Indonesia. So, all efforts should aim at di-
missing them, by pensioning them off and not perpetuating their central role by putting
them behind bars. Justice and prudence sometimes simply do not go together.
At the same time, however, the staff reshuffle should be accelerated. As the direct in-
terference in personnel matters is still anathema to the armed forces, there is an obvious
need for intensive civil-military cooperation. The same applies to the police force. The
problem, however, seems to be that, if necessary, the new powers-to-be, like the old ones,
do not resist the temptation to use the agents of state violence for furthering their own
interests. If this continues, we cannot expect a significant change in the ethos of the secu-
rity forces.
One last point needs to be mentioned in this respect. I just have discussed the “soft-
ware” of change, now I will turn to the hardware. In my view, anybody who believes that
the military or the police would mend their ways while still underpaid and expected to
finance 70% of their own budget is exceedingly naive. Even if they wanted to change,
they could not for the obvious reason that they need the money they earn from legal as
well as illegal business ventures to pay their salaries, significant proportions of their costs
and some extra gratifications. Once more, while no incentives are forthcoming, the
change in direction will not happen. To enhance discipline and the rule of law, and reduce
of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto’s New Order, in: Benedict R. O’G. Anderson
(ed.), Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia, Ithaca/New York (Cornell University Southeast
Asia Program Publications), 2001, p. 26.
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corruption, arbitrariness and violence, incentives such as adequate pay, social prestige,
status and security must be offered.
All of this has only a chance of working if the political elite in the first place and the
Indonesian society in the second is really determined to banish societal violence and,
slowly but surely, delegitimise all private forms of organised violence. As long as all
parties hold on to their militias, violence will remain in the political realm. It is equally
important that the political elite realises that any reform of the police would mean a com-
plete break with the past political-administrative relations. All too often, police reform is
equated with gaining control over the police, not with professionalising them. Again, an
analysis of Paul Brass, derived from the Indian experience, can be applied to Indonesia:
“everybody acknowledges (that the police; P.K.) must be brought under control, for they
do indeed contain a large force of dishonest, intimidating, terrorizing, and marauding
elements. However … all seek to bring the police under their own control: to oversee
their recruitment, their posting, and their behavior, to insure that they act on one’s behalf
and not on behalf of one’s enemies.”81
4. Culture and conflict behavior
The cultural approach to ethno-cultural conflict is more or less nothing more than a fur-
ther specification of the psychological and institutional approaches: it requests them to
check their recipes for cultural commensurateness. Disappointingly, neither the main-
stream of the psychological or institutional efforts really carry out this “culture test”. The
vast majority of handbooks on conflict resolution offer standard recipes, which are sup-
posed to be universally applicable. Lederach who, in a way, is the most culturalist among
the psychologically-oriented conflict resolution practitioners gives only scant attention to
culture in a monography devoted to “Conflict Transformation Across Cultures”82 and
completely loses sight of the cultural dimension of ethno-cultural conflict in the later
development of an “Integrated Framework for Peacebuilding”.83 The same neglect can be
said of the work of the institutionalist school. Although scholars like Donald Horowitz
draw heavily on psychological categories for developing their models of ethno-cultural
conflict, culture is hardly ever present in their studies.
Since the early 1990s especially, this deficiency has been criticised and alternative po-
sitions have been developed by a small number of social scientists, who tried to branch
out into the sphere of culture. They argue that conflicts, as all other forms of social inter-
action are out of necessity cultural events. They occur in a specific cultural setting, are
representations of, filled with, understood through and explained by specific cultural
81 Brass, see above (footnote 29), p. 274.
82 Lederach 1995, see above (footnote 45).
83 Lederach, 1997, see above (footnote 45).
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symbolism. They are “constituted largely by the taken-for-granted, common-sense under-
standings that people have about their world, including themselves and the other people
who inhabit it.”84 A cultural view on conflict therefore tends to accentuate the emic per-
spective, that is the beliefs about social and political conflict held by the members of the
violence-inflicted society. A culture of conflict encompasses not only the cognitive,
evaluative and affective dimensions85 of conflict, but the behavioural patterns, the strate-
gies of conflict management as well as its resolution provided by the specific culture. It
“refers to culturally specific norms, practices, and institutions associated with conflict in a
society.”86 All cultures provide models of legitimate strategies for airing grief and solic-
iting support, all offer rather clear-cut if sometimes ambivalent meanings for loyalty, the
duties of rulers as well as the ruled and sketches of the boundaries between legitimate and
illegitimate protest and rebellion. So, the same event, the same structural configuration
might warrant peaceful protest in one culture, violent reprisal in another and submissive
obedience in a third. Where Ross is concerned, I argue that although social structure
might be “the main factor in determining who the opponents will be”87, it is a terrible
predictor for “the overall level of conflict and violence”88 and for the issues over which
the opponents are ready to fight. It is culture, which “sanctions certain actions taken to
pursue individual or group interests and disapproves of others.”89 Therefore, from a cul-
tural point of view it simply does not suffice to reconstruct the structural configuration of
complex political conflicts, if we aim at an understanding of their developmental logic
and try to devise recipes for their eventual resolution. If, as Leonard Doob once formu-
lated rather succinctly, we really want to “resolve conflicts between members of ethnic
groups who reside in the same society or in different societies, their expectations, interac-
tions, and eventual acceptance or rejection of proposed resolutions are likely to be mark-
edly affected by their cultural backgrounds as well as by their own unique way of behav-
ing and assessing current problems.”90
84 Kevin Avruch, see above (footnote 50), p. 11.
85 This distinction goes back to Kenneth Boulding, who differentiated cognitive, evaluative, and affective
images (The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society, Ann Arbor, (Univ. of Michigan Press), 1956)). In
this categorisation, the cognitive images deal with our beliefs, the evaluative with the values we attach
to our beliefs, and the affective images with “the emotional energy mobilized ... to defend highly valued
beliefs under assault” (Dennis J.D. Sandole, Virulent Ethnocentrism: A Major Challenge for Transfor-
mational Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Era, Paper prepared for the 43rd
Annual convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, 2002, p. 8).
86 Ross, see above (footnote 18), p. 21. For short overviews on the concept of culture of conflict see also:
Ross, The Relevance of Culture for the Study of Political Psychology and Ethnic Conflict, in: Political
Psychology Vol. 18, 1997, pp. 523-544 and Ross, see above (footnote 30).
87 Ross, see above (footnote 18), p. ix.
88 Ross, see above (footnote 18), p. ix.
89 Ross, see above (footnote 18), p. 13.
90 Leonard W. Doob, Foreword, in: Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, Joseph A Scimecca, Conflict Resolu-
tion: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. Westport Conn, London (Praeger), 1991, S. ix.
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If we deplore the high levels of violence in Indonesian polities, we must bear in mind
that many forms and high levels of violence are not necessarily perceived as problematic
by the members of the Indonesian society and polity. From the perpetrators’ point of
view, violence only becomes a liability for political and social action, if it cannot be su-
ficiently legitimised within their own reference group and therefore threatens to undercut
their legitimacy and authority. For the members of a polity there is no urge to violence
reduction in conflict management, if the political players and/or their audience deem this
violence as legitimate. Therefore, under the same “objective” condition, the incentives for
violence reduction can differ sharply between cultures.
The upshot is that in order to understand social conflict we need to reconstruct these
cultural frames of interpretation and social action. Even if cultures were homogenous
units this task would be rather complicated, as the very building blocks of cultures are
symbols and patterns of order woven from interrelated symbols. Symbols, however, never
convey singular meanings, but are plurivocal in nature. They consist of different layers of
meanings, by which they are connected in and to different meaning systems. Therefore,
although they clearly are not arbitrary they are always debatable. Their very nature does
not allow us to think of them as directly “causing” behavior. Instead they should be seen
as providing frames of reference, or glasses through which to view and understand social
reality on which to act.
This notion of cultures of conflict becomes even more complicated, if we turn our at-
tention to the problematic of the simultaneous existence of multiple cultures competing
for the attention of and control over the same individuals. We have to realise that not only
do members of almost all societies simultaneously take part in several cultures, but also a
large number of conflicts take place between members of different cultures. In such cases
of inter-cultural conflict, the chances of misunderstanding are high, as “each side relies on
its own understanding of what is going on, reading unintended meanings into a situa-
tion.”91
It can be argued, however, that in the case of protracted inter-cultural conflicts, there
can also emerge a new culture of conflict management, which applies precisely to the
conflict in question. Habitualisation of interpretative and behavioural patterns over time
develop into reified patterns of order, in which the moves and counter-moves of conflict-
management take place. In due time a new universe of inter-culturally shared meanings
develops, which supports and perpetuates a stable set of social action strategies. There-
fore, a specific kind of trust and security is generated, which is dependent on the continu-
ity of the conflict. That is: intercultural conflict creates in due course the cultural patterns
which safeguard the continuity of the very conflict.
91 Ross, see above (footnote 18), p. 13.
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4.1. A culture of conflict avoidance and the lack of alternatives
to violent conflict resolution
A first point at which a cultural analysis could aim is the often proclaimed Indonesian
culture of conflict avoidance, which is very often brought together with a so-called cul-
ture of tolerance. I would argue that it is precisely in this culture of conflict avoidance
that one important root for the weak capacities for constructive conflict management lies.
Conflict avoidance is possible in traditional societies, where there is basically only one
worldview, shared by the rulers and the ruled and by the old generation and the young.
Conflicts are generally not about the rules of the game, nor the normative foundation of
the social order. A large number of conflicts can be settled by recourse to generally ac-
cepted standards, because the power of established authority prevails. Even rebellions do
not usually challenge the underlying worldview of society, but only its translation into
reality.
The problem with a culture of conflict avoidance under modern conditions, however,
is essentially two-fold:
1. In modern societies, the taken-for-granted, definite, seemingly natural hegemonial
cultural frame which unites all communities in a given setting (be it national, sub- or
transnational) no longer exists. Different cultural communities interact in the same
political system, younger generations challenge the worldview of the older ones by in-
voking alternative cultural scripts, and any given member of a modern society takes
part in several cultures. That allows him to develop a certain cultural distance and
view the cultures not only from within, but alternatively from the outside, that is from
the other cultural systems he partakes in. Inter-group conflicts are often about the rules
of the game and the validity of competing worldviews.
2. If a culture of conflict avoidance reigns supreme and fundamental conflicts arise, there
is no systematic way of dealing with them in such a way that all conflicting groups can
at least safeguard their essential needs – the conflicts tend to be solved by the use of
violence by the hgemonial power.
A hegemonial culture of conflict avoidance will, at least in modern times, quite cer-
tainly periodically lead to efforts of violent conflict resolution. If we realise that in com-
plex and, as in the case of Indonesia, differentially integrated, multi-cultural societies,
conflicts over competing vital interests necessarily exist, then a culture, which tries to
solve problems by avoiding their recognition will run into insurmountable difficulties as
soon as the competing groups are no longer willing to accept the symbolical hegemony of
the dominant power at the center. During the whole era of modern, that is Republican,
Indonesia, politics has been a struggle for the concentration of power in the hands of one
overarching power holder. Despite a large amount of bargaining, ultimately, this struggle
has always been perceived as a pure zero-sum game by all adversaries, as all power has
its specific place, and increasing one party’s power means to take away power from other
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power-holders.92 The problem seems to be that Indonesian political culture neither pro-
vides a viable strategy for compromise nor a practicable option for conflict resolution or
power-sharing, therefore permitting the durable existence of several centres of power
with equal rights. The result has been a policy permeated with large scale violence which
has been more or less systematically used by all contending parties in their quest for po-
litical as well as economic power. Ultimately, the other side of conflict avoidance seems
to be a preference for hierarchical and authoritarian conflict resolution, which more often
than not involves the threat or use of violence.93
4.2. Local cultures of conflict and violence
Regarding the cultural dimension of violent group conflict, I find it especially important
not to disregard the local or regional level too easily in favour of national interpretations.
I find it equally important to realise, that, as local cultures are different in different parts
of Indonesia, we have to think about these specifics of local circumstances, specific
worldviews and cultural practices that brought violence into being and have to be the
basis for its eventual disappearance. I would argue that the South and also, in some way,
the North Molukkas are a case in point. Here, directly after the outbreak of the first wave
of violence in early 1999 and 2000, explanations harking back to machinations of the
Suharto clan, elements within the armed forces or regional elites abounded. Most observ-
ers used an instrumentalist perspective in trying to discount religion and ethno-cultural
animosity as fully fledged reasons for the bloodshed They argued that it was a self-
serving political elite situated partly in Jakarta and partly in Ambon, Ternate as well as
Tidore, and on the national level, which manipulated the fears and apprehensions of the
local population for their own ends. In my view, although not thoroughly false, the argu-
ment does not hold much water.
92 This argument was put forward by the classical study of Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, The Idea of Power
in Javanese Culture, in: Holt, Claire (ed.), Culture and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca, (Cornell University
Press), 1972, pp. 1-69. See also: Martin Klein, Javanismus und Herrschaft in Indonesien: Zum Zusam-
menhang von Kulturinterpretation und Ideologie, (Humboldt-Universität, Institut für Asien- und Afri-
kawissenschaften, Südostasien Working Papers No. 6) Berlin, 1997. It is also underscored in the study
of G. Moedjanto, The Concept of Power in Javanese Culture, Jakarta (Gadjah Mada University Press),
1990. Although Moedjanto somehow tries to connect the concept of royal power to notions of legiti-
macy (as wisdom and justice), he basically perceives it in an a-moral way. Summarising his research, he
argues that the size of a king’s power was characterised by territorial size, number of conquered territo-
ries and nature of tribute, the faithfulness of his officials, the imperial grandeur of ritual and magic
heirlooms, the size of the army and the wealth of his titles and his fame (see p. 104). Ethical restraints
on the use of kingly power did not exist.
93 Arguing from a psychological point of view, it also makes sense to point to the forces of suppression,
whereby the emotions, the feelings of humiliation, impotence, anger and suchlike, as well as alternative
interpretations of the societal worldview have to be suppressed and masked in the legitimate language of
the ruling ideology in the process of conflict avoidance. The analogy of the volcano seems quite apt: in
times of systemic crisis, the suppressed energy translates in explosive violence, because the top, pro-
vided by the hegemonic ideology of the system as well as by its repressive institutional power gives way
and opens up large open spaces, which are up to grabs for all groups who are willing to take the risk.
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The interpretations which stress the element of elite manipulation disregard the per-
ception of the groups in conflict and do not address the aspect of mass response to the
claimed for manipulation. Simply arguing that elites are self-serving with their attempts
to manipulate the broad masses of the people does not explain why their machinations
work, why, in certain cases, people who have been neighbours for decades take machetes
to chop off the heads of their former friends, use fire to destroy their dwellings and rape
or torture them. Elites embarking on the avenue of ethnic outbidding (as is the standard
term in the respective literature) will always be around in times of crisis, but their efforts
at the radicalisation of discourse and the eventual change from non-violent to violent
means of conflict behavior, work only in rare cases. To prevent such elites from suc-
ceeding and to work out strategies which prevent repeated descents into violence, an in
depth knowledge of the dynamics of mass-reaction, of the patterns of thought, which
enable provocateurs to succeed, is indispensable.
In the case of the Moluccan violence, we should now in hindsight accept that the of-
ten-praised, inter-communal reconciliation doctrines of pela gandong and larvul ngabal
were obviously in part nothing more than window-dressing. Is it a show of the strength or
weakness of local practices, if a well-informed observer like Gerry van Klinken comes to
the conclusion, that in the Maluku areas “being Protestant or being Muslim is not merely
a door to a career, but is a state that roots a person in an exclusive life world; viewed from
inside that world, the other – either Protestant or Muslim – is perceived as an enemy.”94
To be sure, during the last few years the two contending groups fought for power, natural
resources, status, local leadership and suchlike, but they had to fight because all of these
necessary conditions of well-being were allocated within exclusive ethno-religious net-
works and there were no functioning social practices which enabled a peaceful and rule-
bound interethnic bargaining process. Violence as a possibility had always been there
over the past decades. The sudden turn toward violence in 1999 became possible because
the cultural preconditions for civil war were already present. One central precondition
was a tradition of fighting villages, as well as of proud reminiscences of wars fought and
won (or lost) long ago. If, as van Klinken recounts, many village leaders “tell stories with
gusto about inter-villages battles that took place in the seventeenth century”, if urban
areas had robust clientelist ties with either Protestant or Muslim villages, which eventu-
ally manned the trenches and control posts, if rural men still have to live up to a tradition
of martial valour, then it only needs a match to light the all-engulfing flames of internec-
ine inter-communal war.
Any party which would have resorted to violence during the Suharto era, would have
had to bear the brunt of the vastly superior repressive power of the state. Under the
changed situation of a dramatically weakened political center, the removal of the former
(authoritarian) rules of the game and the yawning gap in the field of rule-making and
enforcement, made the move to use violence possible. The systemic crisis provided a new
94 Gerry van Klinken, The Maluku Wars: Bringing Society Back In, in: Indonesia 71, April 2001, p. 12.
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window of opportunity for the use of violence. The necessary preconditions, however,
were given in the local worldviews and practices.
Under no circumstances, should we give in to the temptation to excuse or simply dis-
regard the local people, which in one way or another took part in the killings, because we
would then lose sight of an important variable of conflict behavior. This is even more
necessary as the experiences of incredible violence suffered by many members of both
communities as well as the culture of violence and war which by necessity shaped the
perception and behavior of all players, added new layers of meaning to the already exist-
ing meaning systems which made the onslaught possible in the first place. If, in the
Molukkas, over the past five decades both groups could not surmount their respective
traumata and collective fears, it stands to debate that the experiences of the most recent
past add to the prejudices, judgements and opinions, which divide local society along
religious lines (or, in the case of the Northern Moluccas, sometimes predominantly along
lines of traditional loyalty).
4.3. Reframing the Indonesian nation and people
At the fringes of both the cultural and the institutional approaches, we find thoughts on
how different conceptualisations of the nation and people can affect the proceedings of
intra-state conflict management. Cultural approaches would stress that different cultural
notions of community, authority, the respective role of individual, the group etc. coalesce
in the conceptualisation of nation and people, and that therefore these concepts are cen-
trepieces by which conflicts in the national political realm are structured and prefigured.
Institutionalist approaches point to the special role, which the conceptualisation of na-
tion/people has for the constitutional frame, in which certain practices (incentives and
sanctions) of political action are reified. Therefore, in the view of both approaches, ques-
tions of appropriate “nation-ness” loom large for the possible management of violent
conflicts.
One long-term strategy for tackling the phenomenon of violence in Indonesia could be
to analyse, de-construct and reform the beliefs about and understandings connected to the
Indonesian nation and people. The existing Unitarian national paradigm enforces certain
understandings and disallows alternative visions of the Indonesian state and the Indone-
sian people. As the case of India illustrates, federalisation without a correspondingly (re-
)framed concept of the nation does not suffice to reduce ethno-cultural violence. In India
we on the one hand find a federal system, on the other hand, there can be no denial of
pervasive and lasting ethno-cultural violence. This violence has, as in the Indonesian
case, local causes and follows in parts a local logic. It rests however on the problematic
contest between three ideologies for the control of the wh le f Indian society and state.
In India, all three ideologies – Hindu nationalism, Muslim separatism, and secularism –
“have shared a common goal: unity of the entire population or of one of the two largest
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segments of it into united wholes to contest for power at the Center.”95 I  is th  concept of
the nation-state, with its stress on unity that, in a context of strong ethno-cultural identity
groups, produces the totalling tendencies, which in turn often lead to violence. What
ought to be debated anew is the unitarian conception of the state as well as its harmony
and unity-centred conception of the people. Such a discussion can, in the long run lead to
an eventual reframing of the Indonesian concept of nation. 96
From its beginnings in the 1930s, the Indonesian nationalist elite has basically relied
on the unitary vision of an Indonesian nation and people. According to Sukarno, the In-
donesians constituted a “Charaktergemeinschaft” (community united by common char-
acter). The Indonesian nation was not something to be invented in the process of nation-
building, but has existed since time immemorial by the heavenly design of geopolitics:
“the Indonesian Nation is the totality of all the human beings who, according to geopoli-
tics ordained by God Almighty, live throughout the unity of the entire Indonesian archi-
pelago from the northern tip of Sumatra to Irian. All of them, throughout the islands!”97
From this point of view, there is no need, not even a right for self-determination for any
community within the Indonesian nation. There never arose the need to ask the inhabi-
tants of the multitude of islands if they wanted to participate in the Indonesian Nation, as
this Nation was pre-ordained by geopolitics and the will of God.
As far as the two countervailing concepts of unity and diversity were officially juxta-
posed, they were always asymmetrically connected, with diversity being allowed only
within the fold of the idea of a unitary state and a correspondingly unitary people. At least
in the political realm, there was always the tendency to deny the existing diversity by
uniting it on a symbolical level – just look at the ideology-centred efforts of Sukarno with
his variants of Nasakom, or the institution-centred strategies of Suharto Golkar.
In the end, ethnic as well as religious diversity had to be superseded by a newly de-
signed bangsa Indonesia. All communal identities were de-politicised and supplanted by
one overarching black-box of Indonesian identity. The bonds uniting the people of Indo-
nesia should be neither ethnic nor religious identity, but territoriality and imagined com-
mon history. To this extent, they can be called largely civic. Nevertheless, this civic na-
tionalism was a decisively illiberal brand on several accounts. It was highly intolerant of
political demands and the expression of other, competing identities. The idea of popular
sovereignty was purported to signify an order in which the actual sovereignty does not lie
with the individual but with the collectivity.
95 Brass, see above (footnote 29), p. 279.
96 For an excellent recent study on different variants of nationalism and their relationship to sub-national
collective ethno-cultural identities, see David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, ethnocultural
and multicultural politics, London/New York (Routledge), 2000.
97 Sukarno, The Birth of Pantja Sila 1.6.1945, in: Herbert Feith, Lance Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political
Thinking 1945-1965, Ithaca/London (Cornell University Press), 1970, citation p. 42.
42 Peter Kreuzer
From the point of view of a large number of small groups in the Indonesian polity,
however, this strategy amounted to a denial of identity and interest representation. For all
practical purposes, the imagined national community was construed as a continuation of
the Javanese empires. Because Javanese history was in effect posing as national history,
from the standpoint of the populations of the outlying areas the project of nation-building
was perceived as a hegemonial endeavour designed to destroy their cultural identities.
Nation-building as seen from the multiple minorities evolved as a strategy of cultural
“domination by some other rival ethnic, racial, or linguistic community (the Javanese;
P.K.) that is able to imbue that order with the temper of its own personality.”98 To them,
the unitary drive of the Indonesian republic clearly meant cultural, political and economic
marginalisation by an overwhelmingly powerful center.
Contrary to the official founding myth, Indonesia is no natural entity, but an imperial
construction, which emerged out of the power-play between the Dutch and the British.
Sukarno’s myth of god-ordained boundaries should be deconstructed as a device for con-
structing and legitimising claims on territory and people(s). If the modern Indonesian
state is meant be something other than the simple successor to the former imperial power,
his legitimacy cannot be founded at all, or at least in part, on the legacies of the former
greatness of indigenous empires. Basing national history on imperial power means basing
legitimacy on the dominant rule of one part over the other, at least on the symbolical
level, subordinated parts. If imperial rule were to be the foundation of national conscious-
ness, then Austria was to comprise Hungary, Romania and Serbia and several other east-
ern-European regions as well. The Soviet Union would still exist and Turkey could con-
template a return toward the Ottoman Empire. Now, there might be arguments for em-
pires as regimes of authoritarian tolerance, but empires can certainly not pose as nations
and their leaders would certainly not argue that their constituent parts form one people
with one national identity. If Indonesia wants to constitute itself as a modern state, this, in
my view, must be based on the conscious consent of all of her constituent parts.
Therefore, it might be very appropriate to review the Indonesian concept of nation as
well as people. Probably, the Indonesian state could and should be regarded as a multi-
national state, a complex multi-cultural endeavour, in which the potential of all its con-
stituent parts should be brought to the highest degree of fulfilment. If, therefore, people
feel a need to express themselves politically in ethnic terms, this option must be open to
them, because the urge to do so, implies an unfulfilled basic need. The urge for expres-
sion does not vanish, if it is made illegal or suppressed by force. Neither does a nation
grow by force and violence, nor do national and subnational (be it ethnic or religious)
identities exclude each other.
Contrary to those scientists who view the identity dimension of collective conflict as a
mere surface phenomenon or as a category for mobilisation, which in fact does not con-
98 Clifford Geertz, The integrative revolution: Primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states, in:
Geertz (ed.), Old societies and New States: The quest for modernity in Asia and Africa, London (Col-
lier-MacMillan), 1963, pp. 105-157, citation p. 109.
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vey the real causes of conflict, I would argue that group identity is an important autono-
mous dimension of conflict. Therefore, I would call for a conscious acceptance of ethnic
and religious identities as partly political phenomena. If the members of a group are dis-
advantaged because of their communal identity, even if they are only categorised as
members of this communal group, or if they themselves feel the urge to identify with this
identity group, then it seems sensible to offer them the opportunity to express group
identity as well as group interests in the political realm. The freedom of individual choice
is non-negotiable, however.
4.4. Violence is glorious: on the need to reevaluate revolutionary history
One fundamental component of every political culture and especially every culture of
conflict is the understanding of violence as a means of politics. In the case of Indonesia,
we encounter a strange pattern of glorification and mythologisation of certain images of
violence, which ought to be debated.
One often neglected fact, which differentiates Indonesia from all of its immediate
neighbours, is the course of de-colonisation. Whereas Malaysia, Singapore, the Philip-
pines as well as Papua New Guinea (PNG) decolonised in a peaceful and negotiated way,
the Indonesian decolonisation proceeded in a violent manner. Not only was the immediate
decolonisation from 1945 to 1950 filled with violence and conflict, but also the preceding
decades saw a rather antagonistic confrontation between nationalists on the one hand and
the Dutch colonial administration on the other. If we take another look at Malaya, Singa-
pore, the Philippines as well as PNG, we can see that this was not a necessary or seem-
ingly natural course of  history.
This violent course of history is meaningful not only as a social fact as such, but as a
basis for a cognitive pattern which resulted in a mythologisation of the violent character
of the Indonesian decolonisation and the glorification of violence as a legitimate political
means.
To understand better, let us go back to the rule of former President Sukarno. He, and
not just his successor Suharto, periodically took recourse to highly violent means of poli-
tics. Not only Suharto, but Sukarno as well, was ready to sacrifice huge numbers of peo-
ple for an imagined common good. Sukarno was even proud of the extreme violence, by
which the Indonesian nation-building came about. Far from deploring the need to wage
an all-out war against the Dutch colonial overlord, in the course of which the Dutch, but
also the multitude of Indonesian armed forces committed savage crimes against human-
ity, he on a number of symbolically highly-loaded occasions, argued that it was exactly
this savagery, this excessive amount of violence and suffering, which in the end glorified
the Indonesian nation and her anti-colonial revolution. To be categorised as a great na-
tion, territorial size alone was clearly not enough. What was more important in the view
of Sukarno was the correct mindset which had to be translated into a specific kind of po-
litical and social action. Social action signifying greatness had by definition a violent
character. Greatness was intimately related with the will to be a hero. Greatness could be
discerned by the will to struggle. It was not so much the success of reaching a precon-
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ceived aim (for example independence) that counted, but the way chosen. Indonesia – in
the words of Sukarno – was a great nation because it had not received its independence
“as a gift, we are not a nation that pleaded for independence. No, we are a nation that has
waged a life and death struggle for independence, we are a nation tempered to the utmost in
the struggle to build up independence, and we have emerged from this tempering as a na-
tion that is mighty and strong.
And this is, why, Friends, as I said just now, we give thanks to the Almighty that fire rained
upon us in this struggle of ours.”99
Such a rhetoric aims at glorifying violence, at glorifying suffering and sacrifice for
something as intangible as the greatness of a nation. It sits strangely on top of the sup-
posed Indonesian ideology of tolerance and harmony. That such images of violence could
acquire a positive meaning, that they were officially sanctioned models for imitation,
should set policy-makers and analysts thinking. Under Suharto, the rhetoric of the strong
state, of the need to quell all dissent in the name of the national good continued to thrive.
One further aspect of the Indonesian revolution, which until the present time has had
violent repercussions, is the extreme exaltation and mythologisation of the revolutionary
youth, the Pemuda, which allows a host of radical, political players to pose as selfless and
devoted activists for some kind of national or revolutionary cause. Here, it is enough to
point to the multitude of paramilitary gangs and security organisations maintained by all
political parties, by prominent politicians, companies and suchlike. Most disturbing
should be the fact that the state itself made and still makes use of the services of private
organisations of dubious reputation.
These two symbolic frames – violent revolution as well as violent youth – illustrate a
basic need for a demythologisation of Indonesian modern history. The national myth of
the nation, as well as the myth of the revolution and its most important agents until now
only worked to perpetuate the threads of violence, so that now, in the light of a new,
democratically legitimated Indonesia, it is high time to de-construct them as mythmaking
and discard the violent undercurrents.
5. On the feasibility of purposeful change
One most basic question regarding conflict resolution is still in need of an answer: Which
of the above-proposed measures has the highest feasibility and which provides the best
chances for the civilisation of conflict management in the diverse cases of Indonesian
societal violence? After all, the mere fact that mechanisms – be they psychology-, cul-
ture-, or institution-oriented – exist, “does not mean that they will be adopted.”100 The
99 Sukarno, The People's Command for the Liberation of West Irian 19.12.1961, Department of Informa-
tion, Republic of Indonesia, n.d., p. 6 (emphasis added P.K.).
100 Grofman/Stockwell, see above (footnote 57).
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case of Indonesian violence is even more complicated than many others, insofar as ethno-
cultural violence, that is violence between ethno-culturally defined groups, is only one
segment of a more extensive phenomenon of a violent society. Large parts of Indonesia
clearly face the danger of repeating the developments of India. Here, democracy evolved
into a system where
“riots and other forms of localized violence appear to have been integrated into routine
politics. They are anticipated by-products of election campaigns and mass mobilizations
that precede them. … Perhaps, then, we should consider riots themselves as part of the ‘tra-
ditional repertoire’ of political action, of both routine politics and movement politics.”101
The threat of repeating the Indian model, where riots as other forms of state and social
violence have been regularised and become regular means to be used when seen neces-
sary, clearly exists. As the Indian example shows, waiting for a strong civil society to
solve the problem will not suffice. In India as in the case of the Philippines, a strong civil
society exists: a multitude of organisations, a vast amount of free media compete for the
attention of the public. Nevertheless, this civil society102 is part of the system, is pervaded
by repertoires of violence-prone social action. In the end we have to admit, that “(a)ll
sides among the politicians are using the police against each other, while accusing the
other side of doing that very thing, as if it were something exceptional.” 103
The tasks of violence reduction and conflict civilisation are obviously highly depend-
ent on the political class and their perception of politics. None of the above-mentioned
measures will have any chance to change the patterns of violent conflict resolution deci-
sively as long as the national political elite representing the major societal groups fails to
realise that Indonesia is on a slippery slope, which may lead to the abyss of a durably
violent society, that formal democracy is no antidote to violence and Indonesia may be-
come trapped in some kind of perpetual transition. Simply moving away from authoritari-
anism does not end automatically at democracy and societal peace. It may well lead to a
new regime type, which is stable in its very instability This is illustrated by a large num-
ber of other examples from the so-called third wave of democratisation. To have a chance
of surmounting the trap of perpetual transition, there is a dire need on the part of all sig-
nificant elite groups for a fundamental consensus not on political content, but simply on
the basic rules of the game. This, however, has hitherto not been achieved in Indonesia.
What is needed most, however, is a willingness and an ability to learn, that is to cast in
doubt old practices and interpretations. Indonesian politicians should ask themselves, why
Indonesia – the state as well as society – time and again return to patterns of action,
which culminate in violence. To be sure, the Indonesian republic in the 1950s managed to
counter all efforts of resistance against the unitarian design for the state, but why have
101 Brass, see above (footnote 29), p. 13.
102 I once more would concur with Brass who argues that civil society, law and order and criminality are in
the context of Indian politics “word-weapons taken from a discourse without practices consistent with
it.” (Brass, see above (footnote 29), p. 275).
103 Brass, see above (footnote 29), 275.
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these strategies survived, which were only possible for the price of suppression and vio-
lence. They were re-enacted in the early 1960s in the fight for the inclusion of West
Papua and later on in the 1970s in response to the invasion of East Timor. There has
never been any degree of compromise orientation on the part of the state in its dealings
with the demands of the Papua or the Acehnese, which were not just secessionist by a
long way. In recent years, the strategy did change a bit, but the fixation on the unitary
state was maintained undiminished. Probably the two aims of securing national unity and
a unitarian state do not go together in the Indonesian case. What is needed is a change
from the mere repetition of well known theories-in-use and isolated efforts of single-loop
learning to the fundamentally different endeavour of extensive double-loop learning.
What is needed is not just a willingness “to look for another strategy that will address and
work within the governing variables”104 of ocial and political action, but also more fun-
damental sorts of “inquiry, which resolve incompatible organizational norms by setting
new priorities and weighting of norms, or by restructuring the norms themselves together
with associated strategies and assumptions.”105 As long as learning occurs only in a rather
restricted sense, there is a very real danger that the system itself becomes more and more
characterised by “defensiveness, self-fulfilling prophecies, self-fuelling processes, and
escalating error”.106 As long as the (mostly unconscious) theories-in-use are to a large
extent “shaped by an implicit disposition to winning (and to avoid embarrassment) (and
the, P.K.) … primary action strategy looks to unilateral control of the environment and
task plus the unilateral protection of self and others”107, ther  is the very real danger, that
all “actions we take to promote productive organizational learning actually inhibit deeper
learning.”108 One strategy to open up new arenas for learning could be the closure of the
decision-making process, so that bargaining and learning can take place in a secure envi-
ronment, which allows for experiments and open debate. Public processes on the contrary
may fulfil a symbolic need for information and participation, but they also tend to exag-
gerate the need on the part of the decision-makers to adopt an uncompromising and rather
extreme posture and their necessity to sell the compromises as victories for the own party.
Both consequences of public policy processes can prove disastrous with respect to the
chances of cooperative learning in fragmented societies.
Obviously, there is no easy way out and no single strategy will suffice. However, we
should enable people identifying themselves along ethnic lines (that is in terms of com-
mon language, descent, religion, tradition, culture) to voice their grievances within the
legitimate political arena of parliamentary politics. At the same time, ethnic outbidding
104 M.K. Smith/ Chris Argyris, Theories of action. double-loop learning and organizational learning, in: the
encyclopedia of informal education (www.infed.org/thinkers/argyris.htm).
105 Argyris/Schön, see above (footnote 47), p. 18.
106 Chris Argyris, Reasoning, learning, and action: Individual and organization, San Francisco (Jossey-
Bass) 1982, p. 8.
107 M.K. Smith/ Chris Argyris, see above (footnote 104).
108 Chris Argyris, Donald Schön, Organizational learning II: Theory, method and practice, Reading Mass.
(Addsion Wesley), 1996, p. 28.
Options for the resolution of violent ethno-cultural conflicts in Indonesia47
should be undercut by argument, integrative practices on the elite level, and the well-
directed and prompt amelioration of the most pressing grievances aired by these groups.
In the case of Indonesia, this would need a further revision of the party law and an
empowerment of the regions. Both might be feasible as parts of the political elite advo-
cate such institutional redesign (albeit for different reasons).
Many more problems will be encountered by any effort to rethink Indonesian history
and the historically derived patterns of political cognition and action. Nevertheless, as this
is, at least in its beginning, essentially an intellectual task, it depends not so much on the
politicians, but on the capacity of Indonesian intellectuals to attend to this problem. I
would think that research and conferences on traditions of violence, on the worldviews
and ideologies of former national leaders, Sukarno as well as Suharto, on the Campaign
to Crush Malaysia, on highly critical turning points of modern Indonesian history (e.g. the
1965/66 killings) and the role of prominent societal organisations in them, on the image
and history of the pemuda and a host of other similar violence-related research questions
could provide fertile ground, from which a new, less dogmatic, more tolerant and plural-
istic vision of Indonesia could grow.
Psychological as well as cultural workshops in my view develop their strengths not on
the macro level of national politics but on the micro level. They are, therefore, especially
apt instruments for tackling the problem of consolidating fragile peace arrangements b-
tween competing ethno-cultural groups. Most promising seem arrangements through
which, over time, the workshops transform themselves into inter-ethnic institutions which
can, in times of renewed stress, help to keep communication between the groups flowing
and counter ever-present tendencies of ethnic outbidding. As the neighbouring Mindanao
illustrates, however, a flowering of inter-ethnic respectively inter-religious institutions is
not an antidote to the continuance of violent confrontation. Very often, the two phenom-
ena simply coexist. Nevertheless, as promising means are in short supply, no effort can be
spared. The workshop idea might also be helpful in instances of local violence, which
can, at least in part, be traced back to the interplay of local culture and opportunity struc-
ture. Here, the various threads of culture, belief, power-play and structural impediments
as well opportunities can be disclosed and possibly reframed. The limitation of such en-
deavours must be born in mind, however. So in his analysis of the Banyuwangi murders
of 1998 one analyst concludes, that “in the villages … belief in black magic remains as
strong as ever. Villagers continue to fall ill and die as a result of black magic practices.
Feelings of revenge continue to mount and the possibility of another uprising against the
‘bad’ of society always lurks dangerously on the horizon.”109 In a similar argument Don-
ald Horowitz in his masterful analysis of “The Deadly Ethnic Riot” concludes that “in
most countries, there are incremental possibilities for preventing ethnic riots, but few
deliberate paths to prevention. … Although it requires only the absence of a single causal
condition to avert a riot, many such conditions are difficult to manipulate, barring attitu-
109 Jason Brown, The Banyuwangi murders, in: Inside Indonesia No. 62, April-June 2000,
(http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit62/jason.htm).
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dinal changes that may develop over decades. The result of all this is that deadly ethnic
riots can certainly be prevented or controlled at an early stage of their development, but
many are not, and perhaps many never will be.”110
110 Horowitz. see above (footnote 48), p.521.
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Appendix 1:Anatomy of collective violence in Indonesia111
There still is no data available which would allow a clear-cut picture of the anatomy of
collective violence of Republican Indonesia from the date of independence in 1945 to
present-day. In recent months, however, a database covering the last decade of the 20th
century was built up, which enables us to conduct some reliable categorisations for these
years at least. Even though some details of the procedures are open to criticism, the re-
sults of the studies are absolutely clear and indisputable in respect to several crucial as-
pects of social violence in Indonesia. These can be summarised as follows:
Communalist violence is the single most important category of violence and accounts
for 76.9% of all fatalities, the second most important category is separatist violence which
accounts for 22.1% of fatalities. Taken together, these two categories account for 99% of
all deaths. In terms of the relationship between incidents and casualties, communalist
violence is the most severe; the number of casualties per incident is significantly higher
than in all other categories (communal violence: 10.3 deaths per incident; separatist vio-
lence: 2.7 deaths per incident). Collective violence exploded with the demise of the
Suharto’s regime (see following table). Even if it can be argued that the level of violence
during the years of Suharto rule has been underestimated, the tendency towards a steep
rise in collective violence in the years of transition is obvious. This tendency is stable in
respect to both categories – communal and separatist – violence. 112
111 This overview draws heavily on the ground-breaking work of Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, who for
the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) developed a database on all
forms of social violence for the years 1990-2001 and already provided a first analysis of the data (see:
Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Anatomy of Social Violence in the Context of Transition: The Case of
Indonesia 1990-2001, (UNSFIR-Working Paper 02/01-E), Jakarta, June 2002; Mohammad Zulfan Tad-
joeddin, Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001, Jakarta, April 2002.
112 For communal violence see: UNSFIR-Working Paper 02/01-E, ibid., p. 35.
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Table 4: Number of people killed in collective violence 1990-2001 (n) 113
0 0 0 10 0 2
131
1813
1617
1065
227
1343
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
The tendencies, observed so far can be replenished and corroborated by the use of other
data, which precedes 1990. Even if they are not strictly comparable, they provide a simi-
lar picture. Anti-Christian violence, measured by the number of destroyed or damaged
churches rose during the reign of Suharto. This violence against symbols of community
precedes the violence which is aimed against people (see the following table).
Table 5: Destroyed and damaged Christian churches 1945-1998 (n)114
113 See UNSFIR-Working Paper 02/01-E, ibid, p. 29) Not included are the deaths, which occurred in the
secessionist wars in Aceh and West Papua during the years 1990-1997, because prior to 1998 no precise
data was available. It is estimated that in Aceh during the years 1989-1998 between 781 and 1321 peo-
ple were killed in the war between GAM and the state security forces – in the four years from 1998 to
2001 1238 deaths are reported. For Papua, it is estimated that from 1969 to 1998 the estimates vary be-
tween 13,000 and 80,000 deaths, from 1990 to 1997 reportedly 14 people were killed, and in the short
time span from 1998 to 2001, 118 deaths were recorded (see UNSFIR-Working Paper 02/01-E, ibid., p.
44).
114 Indonesia Christian Communication Forum, The Church and Human Rights in Indonesia. Surabaya,
o.J., p. 20. Reliable data for the years after 1998 is missing.
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Interestingly enough, the majority of these anti-Christian outbursts happened in Java:
during the years from 1945 – 1995, 72%, and in the following years 1996-1998, 82% of
all recorded cases. Since we know that the casualty numbers for the years 1993, 1995,
1996 and 1997 had no anti-Christian background, we can infer that (at least in the 1990s)
violence against the symbols of another religious community did not translate into vio-
lence against members of these communities. If we check the data for the regional distri-
bution of collective violence against people, it turns out that the high and medium-
conflict areas (with the exception of Jakarta) were all outside of Java. High-conflict areas
(measured in number of deaths per 100 thousand population) were Maluku (93.4), Aceh
(32.2) and Central Kalimantan (27.0). The highest scores among the medium-conflict
areas are held by Central Sulawesi (17.2), Jakarta (13.5) and West Kalimantan (12.2). As
in other comparable cases (e.g. India)115, social violence in Indonesia is a local phenome-
non. Whereas in some districts, violence abounds, neighbouring districts and districts
with a similar structural configuration remain largely violence-free.
It can be said, at least with respect to the Christian-Muslim relationship, that the vio-
lence against places of worship, which could be observed in the preceding years, did not
simply translate into violence against people. Violence against people clearly erupted in
different places in rather small areas at the fringes of Indonesia. The newly prominent
category of “ethnic-religion-migration violence is concentrated in …. the provinces of
Maluku, Central Sulawesi, West Kalimantan and East Kalimantan. These six provinces
contribute around 73% of deaths in social violence in Indonesia during the period of
1990-2001.”116
115 See for example: Varshney, Ashutosh, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in I ia.
(Yale University Press), 2001, see also his paper: The Relevance of International Research on Ethnic
Conflict for Indonesia: Some Reflections, (UNSFIR Working Paper: 02/05) Jakarta, June 2002.
116 UNSFIR-Working Paper 02/01-E, see above (footnote 111), p. 55.
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Appendix 2:Collective violence in Indonesia: Short sketches of sev-
eral prominent cases
Communal conflict in the Molukkas 1999-2002
Any analysis of the civil-war on the Molukkas117 should differentiate between the region
of Ambon, where violence erupted in early 1999 and North Maluku, which followed in
October 1999. Fighting in Ambon broke out after a brawl between two people of different
faith at a bus terminal on January 19, 1999, the holiest day of the Islamic calendar, Idul
Fitri. The resulting fighting quickly changed into a religious confrontation, pitting Mus-
lims against Protestants. Within days a large number of islands were engulfed in violence.
Several waves of violence alternated with lulls until, in early 2002, a “final peace accord”
was signed in Malino under severe government pressure. Every new wave of violence
brought an enlargement of either the territory engulfed in violence, a change in the weap-
ons used (from machetes and home-made guns to semi-automatic rifles) and an inclusion
of new player groups (as the infamous Islamic militia Laskar Jihad, whose members ar-
rived in June 2000 to reinforce the various Muslim groups). In the course of the fighting,
a complete segregation between Christians and Muslims took place.
Fighting in North Maluku broke out in late August 1999 between several ethnic
groups, which fought over the control of the local administration. By government deci-
sion a new district had been created, in which the original inhabitants of the region would
have been in a minority position compared to the immigrant Makianese, who on top of
this were well represented in the provincial bureaucracy. As the (Christian) indigenous
inhabitants could not prevent government design, they turned to violence. Over time, they
succeeded in driving away a significant degree of the Makianese settlers, who turned to
the two cities of Ternate and Tidore. In a renewed explosion of violence on October 24 an
entire Makianese settlement was burned to the ground, making refugees out of the rest of
the Makianese population. It was at this point in time and in the two central cities of
North Maluku, that the violent conflict changed its colours. In Ternate as well as in Ti-
dore, the conflict was reframed as a conflict between Christians and Muslims. The
117 For additional information on this conflict, see for example: George Junus Adithjondro, Guns, Pam-
phlets and Handie-Talkies: How the military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to pre-
serve their political and economic privileges, In: Ingrid Wessel, Georgia Wimhöfer, Violence in Indone-
sia, Hamburg (Abera), 2001, pp. 100-128 (centers on the aspect of elite manipulation); Nils Bubandt,
Malukan Apocalypse: Themes in the dynamic of violence in eastern Indonesia, in: Wessel/Wimhöfer
(eds). ibid., pp. 228-253 (provides a culturalist interpretation); Gerry van Klinken, The Maluku Wars:
Bringing Society Back In, in: Indonesia, No. 71, April 2001, pp. 1-26 (centers on local political dynam-
ics); Christopher R. Duncan, The aftermath of civil war, in: Inside Indonesia, no. 69, Jan-March 2002
(http:www.insideindonesia.org/edit69/northMaluku.htm), Jaques Bertrand, Legacies of the Authoritar-
ian Past: Religious Violence in Indonesia’s Moluccan Islands, in: Pacific Affairs, March 2002
(http:www.indopubs.com/in.html), Parsudi Suparlan, Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Indonesia, in:
Kultur, Vol. I No. 2, 2001 esp. pp. 44-50 and Peter Kreuzer, Politik der Gewalt – Gewalt in der Politik:
Indonesien, (HSFK-Report No. 4/2000) Frankfurt, 2000; see also the various ICG-Reports on the con-
flict, as well as reports by Human Rights Watch and the Indonesian human rights organization Tapol.
Options for the resolution of violent ethno-cultural conflicts in Indonesia53
Makianese refugees and other Muslims started revenge attacks on the Christian minorities
living in these overwhelmingly Muslim cities. A few weeks later, Christians in Tobelo,
where they were the majority population attacked their Muslim fellow residents and mas-
sacred several hundred of them. The fighting was fuelled by a conflict between the tradi-
tional ruler of Ternate and his rival from Tidore for the seat of governor and control over
the budget of the newly-established province of North Maluku. Both established so-called
traditional armies engaged in the fighting together with extra-regional players as the L s-
kar Jihad contributed to its further escalation. In the course of the conflict, as had hap-
pened in the Southern Moluccas before, the social space was partitioned between Chris-
tians and Muslims, without any neutral space left. North Halmahera became a Christian
controlled territory, whereas Ternate as well as South Halmahera became Muslim do-
mains. The capital of South Maluku, Ambon is unequivocally cut up in Muslims and
Christian sectors, which are divided by one of the central roads. The bifurcation of soci-
ety along religious lines, already prominent before the violence, seems now to be impla-
cable.
Communal conflict between Dayak and Madurese in Kalimantan 1997-2001
A short coherent sketch of the history of this conflict is given in the text of this study (see
p. 14ff). Below, therefore, is just a short sketch of the succeeding waves of violence
which gripped the area since the first explosion of large scale violence in 1997. 118 Th
1997 as well as the 1999 violence centred on Sambas in West-Kalimantan. The 1997
violence cost about 1000 lives and led to the evacuation of some 40,000 people. The 1999
riots were, in the words of Heidhues “less widespread, having almost the character of
‘mopping up’.”119 They nevertheless turned 20-30,000 people into refugees in their own
country. Two years later in early 2001, a new wave of anti-Madurese violence broke out,
this time centring on the town of Sampit in the Central Kalimantan. This renewed vio-
lence cost several hundred, possibly more than one thousand lives and caused up to
50,000 Madurese the flee the island. During the violence, there were countless numbers
118 For further literature, see for example: Human Rights Watch, The horror in Kalimantan, in: Inside Indo-
nesia, No. 51 July-Sept. 1997 (http://insideindonesia.org/edit51/hrw2.htm); Heidhues, see above (foot-
note 32); Ami Marzali., Ethnic Diversity in Conflict: A Socio-Economic Analysis of Social Violence in
Kalimantan, and Syarif Ibrahim Alqadrie, Factors in Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Identity and Consciousness,
and the Indications of Disintegrative Processes in West Kalimantan, both in: Chaider Bamualim, Kar-
lina Helmanita (eds.), Communal Violence in Indonesia, Jakarta (IAIN Jakarta, KAS), 2002, pp. 19-32
and 125-153; Human Rights Watch, see above (footnote 34, on th  1997 violence); Michael Dove,
Dayak anger ignored, in: Inside Indonesia No. 51 July-Sept 1997 (htt ://insideindonesia.org/edit51/
dove.htm); John Bamba, see above (footnote 38); Chronology of violence in Central Kalimantan
(http:www.thejakartapost.com/special/os_sampit_crono.asp; on the 2001 violence); Charles A. Coppel,
Indonesian Chinese in Crisis, Kuala Lumpur et al. (Oxford University Press), 1983, pp. 145-149 (on the
1967 violence). Two excellent studies are: Gerry van Klinken, see above (footnote 74) and International
Crisis Group, Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan, 27. June 2001,
(http://www.crisisweb.org/)
119 Heidhues, see above (footnote 32), p. 147.
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of intermittent small incidents, which either only involved the destruction of property or
cost “only” a few lives. Even if the means of these acts of ethnic cleansing were deplored,
the aims were supported by the local and regional state administrations. In a joint state-
ment issued after the riots in 2001 by the local administration and the leaders of both
Dayak and non-Dayak communities, all signatories agreed that the Madurese should be
evacuated, which in effect means, that their chances for return were minimised. The
community leaders went further in arguing that “the people of Central Kalimantan are
prepared to hold a dialogue towards peace and reconciliation, but only after all Madurese
leave all of Central Klimantan.”120
The anti-Chinese riots of May 1998
Since the beginning of the Asia Crisis in summer 1997, Indonesia has experienced harsh
economic difficulties. Large numbers of people lost their jobs and, as a result of IMF-
sponsored austerity programs, formerly subsidised prices for fuel were scrapped, and the
numbers needing basic food rose significantly. Political discontent mounted and resulted
in large-scale demonstrations. A first round of anti–Chinese demonstrations and small-
scale riots broke out in many parts of Java in January and February 1998. The following
two months passed without any significant incidents. Then, in early May, anti-regime
demonstrations came to a head in Jakarta and many other cities. On one of these demon-
strations four students were shot and killed on May 12, 1998 in Jakarta. A day later, riot-
ing broke out against Indonesians of Chinese descent in Jakarta. Similar riots occurred in
Pading, Palembang, Solo and Yogyakarta.121 Whereas the riots outside Jakarta ended
without large numbers of casualties, in the Jakarta riots, approximately 1,200 fatalities
were counted. Most of these were rioters who, while looting supermarkets, got trapped on
upper floors by fires started by the raging crowds.
Anti-Chinese riots are nothing new in Indonesia. What are new, however, are certain
patterns which were exhibited during the Jakarta riots: most importantly, the systematic
rape of Chinese or Chinese-looking women by groups of young men. The rioters were to
a large extent members of the local (non-Chinese) population. The initial spark, igniting
the riots seems to have been ignited in nearly all cases by provocateurs. Reports abound
about small groups of young men wearing military-style boots which, using crowbars and
similar instruments, “opened” the closed shutters of the stores. They also seem to have
provided part of the gasoline bombs, with which the buildings were set on fire later on.
The riots were followed by an exodus of tens of thousands of Indonesians of Chinese
descent, who left for other south-east Asian destinations, a large part of whom have not
yet returned.122
120 cited after: Minister defends temporary evacuation of Madurese. In: The Jakarta Post 5 March, 2001.
121 A few days earlier a anti-Chinese riot has broken out in Medan resulting in one fatality.
122 For further reading see for example: James T. Siegel, Thoughts on the Violence of May 13 and 14,
1998, in Jakarta, in: Benedict O’G. Anderson see above (footnote 80), pp. 90-123; John T. Sidel. Riots,
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The killing of magicians (ducun santet) 1998
News about people suspected of practising black magic getting killed reappear quite
regularly in the Indonesian press. The killings of 1998, however, had a hitherto unseen
quality. Within a few months, probably up to 150 suspected magicians, and also a small
number of local religious leaders, were killed in a small region in Eastern Java by un-
known assassins who posed as Japanese-style Ninja. At the same time, the killings spread
from the regency of Banyuwangi outward, until several other towns in East and Central
Java were affected. Interpretations of the incidents were manifold and reached from local
elite-conflict to efforts by the armed forces to destabilise the heartland of Indonesia up to
revenge killings of the Communists or their descendants for the bloodbath of 1965/66. All
explanations had one thing in common: they were completely lacking in proof. 123
The great killings of 1965/66
In the years of guided democracy, president Sukarno succeeded in instrumentalising the
two most important loci of political power – the Communist Party of Indonesia (CPI) and
the armed forces. Even though the two were existential enemies, both were used by him
to further his aims and policies. This fragile balance was destroyed in September 1965,
when parts of the CPI abducted several generals, whose dead bodies were found a few
days later. Even though it is still unclear, whether the CPI really committed the abduction
and killings, they were declared to be responsible and within a few hours, the worst reign
of terror set in, which in the course of a few months cost the lives of several hundred
thousand people, who were suspected to be either Communists or their sympathisers. The
main perpetrators were neither the armed forces nor the police, but armed groups attached
to various civil society organisations as religious organisations as well as student organi-
sations. Hughes cites a local Ansor (militia of the NU) spokesman, who described the
killing spree of late-1965 on Java: “So from October to January … we took our revenge.
We knew who were Communists, and we would go to the villages and kampongs and kill
them. The people just went wild against the Communists.”124 It is ra her characteristic that
at that time, as in other communalist conflicts, whole villages were wiped out by their
neighbours – not only on Java, but on all other islands which make up Indonesia.125
Curch Burnings, Conspiracies: The moral economy of the Indonesian crowd in the late twentieth cen-
tury. in: Wessel/Wimhöfer, see above (footnote117), pp. 47-63. For a large number of often appalling
descriptions of violence, see the homepage of the organization of the Indonesian Chinese
(www.huaren.org).
123 For further literature, see for example: James T. Siegel, Suharto, Witches, in: Indonesia, Vol. 71, April
2001, pp. 27ff; Jason Brown, The Banyuwangi murders, in: Inside Indonesia, No. 62, April-June 2000
(http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit627jason.htm).
124 cited in: John Hughes,. Indonesian Upheaval, New York (David McKay Company Inc.), 1967, p. 159.
125 For further literature, see for example: Cribb, Robert (ed.), The Indonesian killings of 1965-1966: Stud-
ies from Java and Bali, Clayton (Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies), 1990; espe-
cially on Bali see: Geoffrey Robinson, The dark side of paradise: Political violence in Bali,
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The Petrus killings of the early 1980s
The Petrus killings started in earnest in March 1983. They were finished in 1985 and left
several thousand suspected criminals dead. The killings were carefully planned, lists of
victims were kept and the eliminated targets were ticked off. The proceedings are remi-
niscent of other countries where para-military groups carried out the dirty work for the
state security apparatus. Victims were identified, visited by several men and, if not shot
on sight, dragged away in a car. After one or a few days, their corpses would be found on
the roadside or in public places, often disfigured by marks of torture. The method of kill-
ing the victims has been highly significant, because it was in this way that the state gar-
nered the symbolic power and violence and integrated it into its own arsenal of power.126
It is important that this kind of extra-judicial killing in these two years happened with the
silent consent of the “people on the street” and the Indonesian mass media.127 It speaks for
itself that President Suharto in his memoirs published in 1989 could publicly declare that
“the peace was disturbed. It was as if there was no longer peace in this country. It was as
though all there was was fear … We had to apply some treatment, o take some stern
action. What kind of action? It had to be with violence. But this violence did not mean
just shooting people, pow! pow! just like that. No! But those who tried to resist, like it or
not, had to be shot … Some of the corpses were left [in public places] just like that. This
was for the purpose of sh ck therapy … This was done so that the general public would
understand that there was still somebody capable of taking action to tackle the problem of
criminality.”128
Separatism in Aceh
Aceh without doubt belongs to the promoters of the Indonesian idea during and immedi-
ately after the revolution. The Acehnese political elite’s view on the imagined nation
differed from those of the national elite in Jakarta, however. Although Acehnese political
Ithaca/London (Cornell University Press), 1995 (esp. chap. 11, pp. 273-303). For an early study, which,
although highly anti-communist in nature, already illustrates the dimension of the killings, see: John
Hughes, see above (footnote 124).
126 On this analysis, see James T. Siegel, A new criminal type in Jakarta: The nationalization of ‘death’, in:
Vicente L. Rafael (ed.), Figures of criminalità in Indonesia, the Philippines, and colonial Vietnam,
Ithaca/New York (Cornell University Southeast Asian Program), 1999, 210-230; see also Barker, see
above (footnote 80), pp. 41-45.
127 For further literature, see for example: Joshua Barker, see above (footnote 80); David Bourchier, Crime,
Law and State Authority in Indonesia, in: Arief Budiman (ed.), State and Civil Society in Indonesia,
Clayton Victoria (Monash University), 1990. pp. 177-212, Siegel, see above (footnote 126); Justus Van
Der Kroef, Terrorism by public authority: The case of the death squads of Indonesia and the Philippines,
in: Current research on peace and violence, no. 10, 1987, pp. 143-158.
128 Suharto. Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya. 1989, cited in: Geoffrey Robinson, Rawan is as Rawan
does: The Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh, in: Benedict R. O’G. Anderson (ed.). Violence and
the State in Suharto’s Indonesia. Ithaca/New York (Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publi-
cations), 2001, pp. 213-242, citation p. 227-228.
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leaders were strongly pro-Republican, they argued for a significant amount of autonomy
for the regions and the establishment of Indonesia as an Islamic state (Negara I l m In-
donesia). When, in the early 1950s, it became clear that both wishes would remain unful-
filled, the Darul Islam rebellion broke out under the leadership of Teungku Daud. This
rebellion lasted until 1962. After complex negotiations the rebels succeeded in winning
recognition for Aceh as a special region (Daerah Istimewa) even though they had to con-
cede defeat with respect to the issue of the Islamic state. From then on, peace ruled in
Aceh for more than one decade.129 In 1976, a new rebel movement – Aceh Merdeka –
emerged under the leadership of, Hassan di Tiro, a grandson of Teungku Cik di Tiro, a
hero of the Aceh war (1873-1903) against the Dutch. A few months after its inauguration,
it declared independence. As the rebels’ efforts to mobilise the Acehnese met with no
success, their leader Hassan di Tiro, who had been living abroad since the 1950s and only
returned in 1976 left Indonesia again in 1979 and formed a government in exile in Sw-
den, where he still resides in 2002. Until the end of the 1980s, the movement was no
more than a small nuisance to the local and national authorities. In early 1989, however,
the group resorted to armed attacks on military and police installations as well as civil-
ians. Then a swift process of escalation set in: the government resorted to military cam-
paigns, deployed new troops and declared Aceh a Military Operations Area (Daerah Op-
erasi Militer, DOM). In the course of the military operations, civilians were killed,
abused and their properties destroyed, widening the range of people sympathetic to the
cause of the rebels. The state strategy of intimidation by means of systematic terror back-
fired in Aceh, as it did in most other cases. The violence escalated and the population
really became the sea, in which the guerrilla of the Aceh Merdeka could swim. The social
space was reduced to zero. Nobody could stand apart or claim neutrality, with the result
that deep rifts emerged within the local communities whose members were forced to take
sides and take part in the conflict (as informants, guides, and above all as victims).
Aceh’s DOM-status was finally revoked by President Habibi in 1998. The conflict, how-
ever, did not end then, but contrary to expectation, escalated under the successive Presi-
dents of Wahid and Megawati. After the at least temporary extinction of the flames of
communalist violence in the Moluccas, Aceh remains the region with the highest ratio of
violence.130 How it will fare after the signing of an initial Peace Accord between the In-
donesian state and the guerilla in the beginning of December 2002 remains to be seen.
129 The province had its share of the violence in 1965/66, when the various religious leaders gave to green
light to their groups to eliminate suspected Communists and other leftist elements.
130 For further literature, see for example: Robinson, see above (Fn 128), pp. 213-242; Ariffadhillah, The
Recent Situation in Aceh after the Joint Understanding on a Humanitarian Pause for Aceh, in: Wes-
sel/Wimhöfer (eds.) see above (footnote 117), 2001, S. 317-334, Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Between war
and peace, in: Inside Indonesia no. 70 April-June 2002 (http:www.insideindonesia.org7edit707
otto1.htm); and of course the reports by the ICG, HRW and Tapol. For the earlier years of the Acehnese
rebellion, see: Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, Ithaca/New York (Cornell Modern Indon-
sia Project no. 74), 1995.
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Separatism in West Papua131
Separatism in West Papua goes back to the day Indonesia took control over the territory
from the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTAE) on 1 May 1963. The
promised “Act of Free Choice”, by which it was to be ascertained whether the Papuas
really wanted to be integrated into Indonesia was delayed until 1969 and then only about
2000 representatives handpicked by the Indonesian government were allowed to opt for
the inclusion of West Papua. To make sure that the results of the deliberations would be
in accordance with Indonesian preferences, the local Indonesian military commanders
made it clear that the delegates had families and belongings which might suffer in the
case of recalcitrance. No wonder that every single delegate opted for integration. The UN,
happy to close the book on West Papuan decolonisation, accepted the proclaimed results
of the fraudulent act. Several local rebellions had already taken place between the with-
drawal of UNTEA and the so called Act of Free Choice. All were crushed by the vastly
superior fire power of the Indonesian armed forces. Nevertheless revolt followed revolt.
Without any clear-cut centralization, the various West Papuan resistance groups managed
to merge into the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM). The tough measures of the Indone-
sian armed forces “swelled the ranks of resistance.”132 In 1970, the initially pro-
Indonesian Seth Rumkorem, who eventually also joined the Indonesian army in 1962,
graduated from Bandung military academy and became a member of the elite Diponegro
division, changed sides and formed a new guerrilla force. He was to become one of the
most important military leaders of Papua resistance. During the following decades, the
OPM led a low-level guerrilla war against the Indonesian security forces. Due to limited
capabilities and serious internal infighting, these activities never threatened Indonesian
control over the territory. Nevertheless, Indonesia responded with the violent suppression
of all indications of criticism. Since the early 1970s, Indonesia had tried to secure control
over West Papua by large-scale transmigration programs. Whereas in 1960, only 18,600
out of an estimated population of 736,000 (that is 2.5%) were non-Papuan, their numbers
131 For further information, see for example Robin Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerrilla Strug-
gle in Irian Jaya, Sydney (Allen & Unwin), 1985; explicitly anti-Indonesian but well-informed is the
study by Kees Lagerberg, West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism, New York (St. Martin’s Press), 1979. On
the nature of the OPM and their support structures, see for example: Peter Savage, The National Libera-
tion Struggle in West Irian: From Millenarianism to Socialist Revolution, in: Asian Survey Vol. 18 No.
10, Oct. 1978, pp. 981-995 and R.J May, Sources of External Support for the West Papua Movement,
in: K.M. de Silva, R.J. May (eds), Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict, London (Pinter Publishers),
1991, pp. 158-180. For newer depictions, see for example: Benny Giay, West Papuan strategies of re-
sistance against Indonesian political and cultural aggression in the 1980s, in: Wessel/Wimhöfer, see
above (footnote 117), pp. 129-138; and especially the well researched studies by the International Crisis
Group, Indonesia: Resources and Conflict in Papua, (ICG Asia Report No. 39), 13. Sept. 2002
(http:www.crisisweb.org), and: Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya, (ICG Asia Report No. 23),
20. Sept. 2001 (both: h tp://www.crisisweb.org)  For the early history up to 1963, see for example:
Arend Lijphart, The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea, New Haven/London
(Yale University Press), 1966.
132 Osborne, see above (footnote 131), p. 38.
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had already climbed to nearly 140,000 in 1982 and rose to about 450,000 in 1998.133
Since the regime change in 1998, Papuan nationalism has been brought out into the open.
The Papua argue that de jure West Papua has been sovereign as a nation and state since 1
December 1961, when, the decision of the National Committee on a national flag, an
anthem and a name was realised by raising the Morning Star beside the Dutch Tricoloure.
In the course of this ceremony ”the new anthem was sung for the first time in front of the
New Guinea Council and in the presence of the Governor of Dutch New Guinea and
members of the Council”134. This view on Papuan independence is shared not only by
radicals, but by large tracts of the established Papuan political elite in Jayapura. In the
meantime, the Parliament in Jakarta, as in the case of Aceh, granted a special autonomy
(Otonomi khusus) to West Papua, which, however, has to date not changed the Papuan
aspirations to any degree. The most important organisation representing Papuan interests
is no longer the OPM, but the Papuan Council (Dewan Papua) and its Presidium, which
were created in mid-2000 and which up to now has been rather successfully uniting the
mainstream of Papuan society in their efforts for eventual independence. However, Presi-
dent Megawati, daughter of former President Sukarno, who brought Papua into the fold
of Indonesia, remains vehemently opposed. For her, as for her father “without Irian Jaya,
Indonesia is not complete.”135
133 ICG, 20 Sept. 2001, see above (footnote 131), p. 5-6. Even though the numbers are not completely
comparable they, in spite of some reservations, convey a correct picture on the magnitude of change.
134 ICG, 20 Sept. 2001, see above (footnote 131),p. 4.
135 Megawati 1999, cited in ICG. 20 Sept. 2001, see above (footnote 131), p. 1.
